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Abstract – Comprensione precoce degli indizi di possesso 
 
Il concetto di proprietà identifica la relazione esistente tra più individui nei confronti di 
un determinato bene. Tale relazione si esplica nella capacità di stabilire e mantenere il 
controllo su un bene e nella possibilità di escludere gli altri dall’uso di quel bene. La 
proprietà di un oggetto può essere inferita a partire da una serie di indizi spazio-
temporali che legano un soggetto ad un oggetto, come ad esempio il contatto fisico, la 
prossimità e il controllo. La precoce capacità di identificare tali indizi e di rispettare il 
possesso altrui permette ai bambini di evitare i conflitti e costruire stabili relazioni tra 
pari. 
Attraverso due lavori sperimentali condotti su infanti di 6 e 9 mesi sono stati indagate 
(a) l’abilità di identificare gli indizi percettivi di possesso (b) la capacità di riconoscere 
quando il possesso viene violato (c) la capacità di rispettare il possesso altrui. Un 
elemento chiave di questa ricerca è stato quello di indagare la comprensione delle 
relazioni di possesso attraverso l’uso due diversi approcci sperimentali: un paradigma di 
preferenza visiva dove il bambino doveva osservare delle interazioni soggetto-oggetto 
(Studio 1), e un paradigma interattivo dove il bambino veniva direttamente coinvolto 
nell’interazione soggetto-oggetto (Studio 2). 
Lo Studio 1 analizza le abilità socio-cognitive del bambino attraverso il suo 
comportamento visivo. Nello specifico, il paradigma sperimentale prevedeva che agli 
infanti venissero mostrate delle animazioni video in cui delle figure geometriche dotate 
di movimento auto-prodotto compivano azioni finalizzate al raggiungimento di oggetti 
inanimati e/o interagivano tra loro. I risultati ottenuti suggeriscono una comprensione 
precoce degli indizi di possesso, della violazione del possesso e delle regole sociali alla 
base della nozione di proprietà. 
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Lo Studio 2 indaga la comprensione delle relazioni di possesso attraverso un paradigma 
interattivo. Nello specifico, le mie domande riguardavano come e quando la capacità di 
rispettare il possesso altrui emergesse durante la prima infanzia e se il processo di 
acquisizione di un oggetto da parte del bambino (ovvero l’atto di impossessarsi di un 
oggetto) fosse influenzato dal possesso altrui.  Lo scopo principale dello studio era 
quello di analizzare il comportamento del bambino durante un compito di scelta tra due 
oggetti. A seconda della condizione, uno dei due oggetti poteva essere in contatto fisico 
o prossimità con la mano dello sperimentatore. I risultati mostrano come i meccanismi 
alla base del rispetto del possesso altrui emergano relativamente presto durante 
l’infanzia. Tuttavia, il processo di acquisizione sembra essere influenzato dalla 
compresenza di diversi meccanismi che dirigono la preferenza dell’infante verso uno 
dei due oggetti. Si ipotizza che la competizione tra tali meccanismi conduca a esiti 
differenti in funzione delle abilità socio-cognitive e motorie del bambino e del contesto 
in cui l’interazione soggetto-oggetto si verifica. 
Nonostante il crescente interesse nei confronti della comprensione del concetto di 
proprietà e dei diritti ad esso associati durante l’infanzia, pochissimi lavori sperimentali 
hanno investigato la comprensione delle relazioni di possesso nei bambini al di sotto 
dell’anno di vita e la capacità di rispettare il possesso altrui. I risultati di questa ricerca 
sembrano suggerire l’insorgenza relativamente precoce di tali abilità, supportando l’idea 
secondo cui alcuni meccanismi di ragionamento sociale siano già presenti 
nell’architettura cognitiva degli individui e probabilmente affondino le loro radici nella 
nostra storia evolutiva. 
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 Abstract – Early understanding of cues of possession 
 
The concept of ownership refers to a particular relationship between several individuals 
and an object. The relationship consists of the power of an individual to establish and 
maintain control over an object and the possibility to exclude others from that object. At 
a basic level, objects’ ownership is expressed and recognized by others through a set of 
spatial-temporal cues such as subject-object physical proximity or contact, actual 
control, and first possession. The ability to identify these cues and respect others’ 
possession early in life enables children to avoid conflict and build stable relationships 
with peers. 
The aim of this research is to examine the cognitive bases of sense of ownership and to 
explore how the understanding of the social norms concerning ownership evolve during 
the first year of life. 
In two experimental studies, I examined (a) infants’ ability to identify physical cues of 
possession, (b) infants’ ability to recognize violation of possession, and (c) infants’ 
ability to respect others’ possession. A key goal of this research was to examine 
ownership cognition adopting two different methodological approaches: a classical 
visual paradigm where the infant was observing a subject-object interaction (Study1), 
and an interactive paradigm where the infant was directly involved in a subject-object 
interaction (Study 2).  
In Study 1, I focused my investigation on ownership understanding analyzing infants’ 
social-cognitive abilities from a third-person perspective. Specifically, I presented 6 and 
9-month-old infants with a set of non-verbal video animations representing object-
oriented goal scenarios and interactions between two animated agents. Results from 
these experiments suggest that, as third-party observers, infants seem to recognize 
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others’ possession by showing interest when possession is violated and, possibly, the 
social rules concerning ownership.  
In Study 2, I focused on ownership cognition by analyzing infants’ behavior from a 
first-person perspective. Specifically, my questions concerned how and when the 
abilities to respect others’ possession emerge during development and how the 
acquisition process (i.e., the act of taking possession of an object) could be affected by 
others’ possession. The aim of this study was to analyze infants’ behavior in a choice 
task involving two objects. Depending on the condition, one of the two objects could be 
either in physical contact or in proximity with the experimenter’s hand. Results suggest 
that the mechanisms that elicit respect of possession emerge quite early during 
development. Nevertheless, the acquisition process seems to be affected by the co-
occurrence of different mechanisms that drive the infant’s preference toward one of the 
objects. I hypothesize that the competition between these mechanisms leads to different 
outcomes depending on the infant’s socio-cognitive skills and motor abilities and on the 
context where the subject-object interaction occurs.  
Despite the growing interest in the development of the notion of ownership and property 
rights, only very few experimental studies have investigated the understanding of 
possessive relationship in preverbal infants, and their ability to respect others’ 
possession. Results of the research presented here suggest a very early emergence of 
these abilities, supporting the idea that some of the mechanisms responsible for dealing 
with ownership recognition are rooted in our evolutionary history and probably shared 
with other animal species. 
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PART 1 – THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
CHAPTER 1  
The notions of ownership and possession  
The concepts of ownership and possession refer to a particular relationship between 
several individuals and an entity. The relationship consists of the power of an individual 
to establish and maintain control over an object; the ability to control entails the 
possibility to exclude others from that object (Merrill, 1998; Snare, 1972). Ownership 
differs from possession because it does not need physical contact or actual control of the 
objects; essentially it is an invisible, abstract characteristic of objects, in the sense that 
one can be an owner of a thing without being in actual control of that thing. The two 
concepts are indeed conceptually different: ownership refers to the legal right to control 
a thing and exists thanks to a body of normatively stipulated conventions, while 
possession refers to the practical ability to control a thing. Regardless of this, ownership 
and possession may commonly coincide in people’s appraisal. For example, in humans, 
like in other animal species, everyday attributions of ownership are primarily based on 
the ability to perceive and identify cues of physical possession such as contact, 
proximity, and actual control (Friedman, 2008; Merrill, 2015). 
From a developmental perspective, possessive relationships play a crucial role in social 
interactions from infancy. Nevertheless, the age of emergence of a mature 
understanding of the normative nature of ownership is difficult to define. The body of 
studies on children reveals the existence of a relatively long period of overlap between 
the two concepts where the comprehension of possession and experience of possessive 
relationships are propaedeutic to the development of the abstract concept of ownership 
and property rights (Blake & Harris, 2011; Friedman & Neary, 2008). 
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Scholars from various disciplines have been interested in the nature of possessive 
behaviors, and philosophical theories on ownership have been discussed since the 
classical antiquity (see Rudmin, 1991 for a review). Ownership has been studied in a 
variety of populations, including infants and children (e.g., Fasig, 2000; Furby, 1980; 
Rochat, 2010), elderly individuals (e.g., Cram & Paton, 1993; Kamptner, 1991), and 
animals (e.g., Kummer & Cords, 1991; Sigg & Falett, 1985). Socio-anthropological 
studies have been conducted within different ethnic groups and across different socio-
economic levels (Patricia Kanngiesser, Rossano, & Tomasello, 2015; Rudmin, 1988, 
1996). Several legal, economical and psychological theories have been developed 
around this topic and the complex and multifaceted nature of the phenomenon has been 
widely investigated both through speculative and experimental research (Belk, 1988; 
Demsetz, 1967; Merrill, 1998; Pierce, Kostova, & Dirks, 2003; Reb & Connolly, 2007; 
Rose, 1985; Van Dyne & Pierce, 2004). Recently, the neural and cognitive bases of the 
sense of ownership have been analyzed through neuroimaging techniques (Kim & 
Johnson, 2014; Krigolson, Hassall, Balcom, & Turk, 2013; Turk, van Bussel, Waiter, & 
Macrae, 2011) and motor-behavioral analysis (Constable, Kritikos, & Bayliss, 2011; 
Constable, Kritikos, Lipp, & Bayliss, 2014). 
Ownership reasoning affects our thinking and behavior towards multiple varied aspects 
of everyday life. A common understanding and respect of ownership regulates much of 
our behavior towards both objects and other individuals. During infancy and early 
childhood, the ability to understand first possessive relationships and later ownership 
rights is essential to navigate and act effectively on the physical and social environment. 
Ownership and possession are involved in many daily life activities like giving and 
taking, buying and selling, borrowing, begging, stealing, and so on. Regarding what can 
be owned, ownership can be applied to a wide variety of entities: objects (Dittmar, 
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1989; Prelinger, 1959), lands (Rudmin & Berry, 1987; Verkuyten, Sierksma, & Thijs, 
2015; Zebian & Rochat, 2012), work (Holmes, 1967; Pierce, Kostova, & Dirks, 2001), 
new creations (Kanngiesser, Gjersoe, & Hood, 2010; Levene, Starmans, & Friedman, 
2015), symbols (Dittmar, 1991), ideas (Goodenough & Decker, 2009; Olson & Shaw, 
2011; Shaw, Li, & Olson, 2012), living entities such as animals and other people (L. 
Ellis, 1985; Prelinger, 1959; Rudmin & Berry, 1987), and body parts (Vondervoort & 
Friedman, 2015). 
The concept of ownership involves different rights and duties, and an entire branch of 
law, property law, is concerned with ownership and possession. Snare (1972) suggested 
the existence of three main rights associated with ownership. An owner has the right of 
possession and use, the right to exclude others from possession, and the right to transfer 
possession to another individual. Non-owners must recognize and respect these rights, 
and when a transfer of ownership occurs, the previous owner relinquishes his rights by 
becoming a non-owner, while the rights associated with ownership are transferred to the 
new owner. In every known human society, respecting others’ property is a fundamental 
norm of common life. Human societies that have a formal legal system protect 
possession and ownership as a matter of law. Societies that do not have a formal legal 
system protect possession through a set of informal norms and common practices. 
Ownership violations are prosecuted through a set of penalties that can vary depending 
on cultural differences. However, individuals who violate the norm are typically 
disapproved, mistrusted and punished with retaliation by the whole community. The 
body of behavioral and anthropological evidence identifies respect for possession as a 
universal social norm, with low variation in space and time, and scarcely dependent on 
cultural constraints (Merrill, 2015). 
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Although ownership is a social notion, some theoretical and empirical works have 
examined ownership at the individual level by analyzing the dyadic relationship 
between a single individual and an object. These studies highlight the psychological 
effect of self-ownership on both object- and self- perception and evaluation (Belk, 
1988a; Cunningham, Turk, Macdonald, & Neil Macrae, 2008; Cunningham, Vergunst, 
Macrae, & Turk, 2013). Other studies have addressed the issue considering the social 
nature of ownership relationship. These works examine people’s reasoning and behavior 
toward others-ownership, considering patterns of collective behavior and their 
compliance with different rights and duties associated with the institution of property 
(e.g., Friedman, 2008; Kalish & Anderson, 2011). Within this context, some of them 
suggest that many of our behaviors and psychological tendencies concerning ownership 
are evolutionary adaptations to social life (Ellis, 1985).  
Possession is important in social interactions from infancy, and the concept of 
ownership has been suggested as one of the earliest forms of abstract thinking (Fasig, 
2000; Furby, 1980; D. F. Hay, 2006). Compelling evidence of the early importance of 
ownership are, for example, the attachment children express towards some objects 
(Winnicott, 1971) and the large amount of conflicts about possession during childhood 
(Hay, Hurst, Waters, & Chadwick, 2011; Ross, Conant, & Vickar, 2011; Ross, 2013). 
During development, it is likely for sensory-motor experience associated with objects 
possession to play an important role in ownership cognition. However, separating the 
concept of abstract ownership from that of physical possession has resulted in a gap in 
the description of the early developmental steps that lead to a conceptual understanding 
of this relationship (however, see Blake & Harris, 2011 and Rochat, 2011 for 
speculative models). According to Furby (1980) the the early notion of possessiveness 
arise from the combination of two hard-wired components of human behavior that 
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describe the triadic relationship between an infant, an object and another individual. 
One component is represented by infants’ exploratory behavior (effectance motivation) 
and is the child’s drive to possess, control and have an effect on the external 
environment. The other component is the limit caregivers impose on the infant’s drive 
to possess, in order to avoid dangerous consequences. The resultant effect of these 
contrasting components is that infants gradually learn to distinguish those objects that 
they can touch and grab (mine) from those that are off limits (not-mine).  
By contrast, Rochat suggests that a minimal sense of possession is present in humans 
from birth. The notion of ownership hence develops from the point in time when infants 
extend their sense of self (including the sense of agency) to objects. Between 3 and 6 
months of age, property consists in use and possession: infants use objects, but they do 
not seem to experience any form of entitlement over them. Later, by the end of the first 
year of life, they start to include objects in their interactions with other individuals, and 
gradually their sense of exclusive and pre-conceptual possession becomes a sense of 
alienable and conceptual possession. With a different approach, Blake and Harris 
propose a developmental model where children include ownership as an attribute of 
their object representations. They suggest that an early understanding of ownership 
concepts begins with a simple visual association between a subject and an object, and 
develops later combining and integrating the visual source with verbal information 
(Blake & Harris, 2011). The importance of a visual source of information to make 
inferences about objects ownership emerges also from a study by Blake and colleagues 
(Blake, Ganea, & Harris, 2012). Results from this study show that when the visual and 
verbal information about objects ownership are contradictory, children until 5 years of 
age tend to favor the visual cues over the verbal information in their ownership 
attributions. 
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The majority of empirical evidence of ownership attribution skills in young children 
relies on explicit judgments such as the use of possessive pronouns or the ability to 
identify objects belonging to oneself and to others (ownership understanding index: 
Fasig, 2000; Brownell, Iesue, Nichols, & Svetlova, 2013). The ownership understanding 
index measures the children’s ability to remember associations and past experiences 
between a subject (self or other) and an object; this ability requires the development of 
an extended historical self. Indeed, as stated by Fasig (2000): “recognition of the owned 
object and association of the object with the self requires knowledge of the self in 
conjunction with the object in the past”. According to Gelman and colleagues (Gelman, 
Noles, & Stilwell, 2014), the status of ownership, although an invisible feature, 
improves attentive processing and memory of objects both in adults and in children. 
They suggest that the ability of tracking owned objects derives from an early emergent 
and spontaneous disposition to track people, their actions, and inanimate but socially 
relevant items. A more detailed description of studies concerning the concepts of self- 
and others-ownership and their development will be presented later. 
 
The notion of affordance  
The interaction of an individual with an object may be described in terms of affordance. 
Gibson (1977) defines affordances as properties in the environment that are relevant for 
an organism’s goals. Nevertheless, affordances cannot be defined in terms of physical 
properties of the environment only. They represent practical opportunities offered by the 
environment to an organism that is able to perceive and use them. Thus, affordance 
implies the coupling of perceiving and acting. Affordances may therefore be thought of 
in terms of a mutual relationship between the environment and the organism. 
Recent literature on micro-affordance (a term proposed by Ellis & Tucker, 2000 which 
11 
 
refers to a specific kind of interaction with objects, such as reaching and grasping) 
highlights the existence of brain networks representing objects in terms of actions that 
can be performed with them (for a review see Thill, Caligiore, Borghi, Ziemke, & 
Baldassarre, 2013). For example, behavioral and neuroimaging studies show that 
observing objects (or pictures of objects) activates specific motor acts corresponding to 
reaching and grasping behaviors typically performed with them (Grèzes & Decety, 
2002; Tucker & Ellis, 2001). 
The perception of the affordance of an object could depend on its spatial location. In a 
study by Costantini and colleagues (Costantini, Ambrosini, Tieri, Sinigaglia, & 
Committeri, 2010), authors show that the perception of affordance suggests a motor act 
only when the object is presented within the participants’ reaching space. At the same 
time, peripersonal space can be extended when individuals are provided with tools 
useful to reaching objects (Berti & Frassinetti, 2000; Farnè & Làdavas, 2000; Iriki, 
Tanaka, & Iwamura, 1996; Maravita, Spence, Kennett, & Driver, 2002). Reaching space 
remapping occurs both during active tool-use and through the observation of tool 
actions performed by others (Costantini, Committeri, & Sinigaglia, 2011). Despite the 
growing knowledge about the mechanisms defining the functional relationship between 
a singular individual and an object, little is known about the behavioral and neural 
mechanisms encoding the social dynamics of our interactions with objects. Recent 
literature shows how the social context in which the action occurs could affect the 
planning and execution of movements towards (or with) objects (for a review see 
Becchio, Sartori, & Castiello, 2010). For example, the kinematics of reaching to grasp 
an object can be influenced by the presence of another person and it is modulated by the 
strength of the affiliative relationship between the two people (Gianelli, Scorolli, & 
Borghi, 2013). Moreover, kinematics could change depending on the final goal of the 
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performed action (i.e. social intention/non social intention) (Ferri, Campione, Dalla 
Volta, Gianelli, & Gentilucci, 2011; Sartori, Becchio, Bulgheroni, & Castiello, 2009; 
Claudia Scorolli, Miatton, Wheaton, & Borghi, 2014).  
 
Empirical studies on ownership: self-ownership 
Speculations about the existence of a strong link between ownership and the self have 
been made in the realms of philosophy, psychology, anthropology and economics (Belk, 
1988; Brown, Pierce, & Crossley, 2013; Pierce, Kostova, & Dirks, 2001). Self-
ownership association is commonly expressed by the psychological attachment we feel 
towards our property (objects or other entities that we consider to belong to us) and by 
the sense of power and control we experience towards owned entities. This association 
is bidirectional: on the one hand ownership may be considered an extension of the self 
(Belk, 1988a), on the other hand, owned things contribute to self-construction and 
definition (Dewey, 1922). Furby (1991) suggests that the feeling of ‘mine’ emerges in 
close connection with the feeling of ‘me’ during infancy and derives from the innate 
propensity of infants to control objects and to be effectant on the environment. 
Similarly, Rochat (2011) affirms that by 2 months of age, infants begin to explore the 
self as agent through control over the objects, incorporating the objects into the self. 
Owned objects acquire a special cognitive and affective meaning. Several studies on 
human and non-human primates show the existence of preference biases towards owned 
objects, even when ownership is a transient event (Beggan, 1992; Belk, 1988; S. 
Brosnan, Jones, & Lambeth, 2007; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991; Knetsch & 
Sinden, 1984; Lakshminaryanan, Chen, & Santos, 2008). These effects are enhanced 
when participants can touch or manipulate the owned objects (physical possession) 
(Peck & Shu, 2009; Reb & Connolly, 2007). In a study by Peck and colleagues authors 
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found that merely imagining to touch an object (haptic imagery) resulted in an increase 
in perceived ownership and positive valuation of that object (Peck, Barger, & Webb, 
2012). 
People also show enhanced awareness towards owned objects, like attentional biases 
and increased memory performance (Cunningham, Brady-Van den Bos, & Turk, 2011; 
Cunningham et al., 2008, 2013). Recent neuroimaging studies suggest that the cognitive 
system favors the processing and representation of self-owned things recruiting in part 
the same brain regions involved in self-processing (Cunningham et al., 2011; Kim & 
Johnson, 2014). 
In developmental research, explicit measures of ownership understanding from a first-
person perspective are primarily based on the use and comprehension of possessive 
pronouns (D. F. Hay, 2006; Saylor, Ganea, & Vázquez, 2011). Saylor and colleagues, 
for example, show that already at 12 months of age infants are able to understand the 
meaning of “my” when they have to determine to which of several things a person was 
referring. Nevertheless, it is between 15 and 18 months of age that they start to use 
personal pronouns to express their own possession (Hay, 2006).   
Implicit assessments of ownership comprehension are gathered from behavioral 
observation of children during peer interactions (D. F. Hay et al., 2011; D. F. Hay, 
Nash, & Pedersen, 1983; Hildy Ross et al., 2011) or, in experimental settings, when 
children are directly involved in live interactions concerning ownership (Patricia 
Kanngiesser & Hood, 2014; Federico Rossano, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2011; Vaish, 
Missana, & Tomasello, 2011). With regard to experimental studies, research has mainly 
focused on children’s reaction to violations of their/others’ ownership (i.e., stealing, 
alteration, destruction), finding that an emotional reaction occurs earlier related to self-
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ownership violation than to the violation of others-ownership. Due to the complexity of 
these tasks, these abilities have been investigated mainly in children and not in infants. 
 
Empirical studies on ownership: others-ownership 
With respect to others-ownership, experience and judgment of physical possession 
facilitates the respect of property rights. There is evidence describing this ability as a 
basic cognitive mechanism, grounded in our sensory-motor system and rooted in our 
evolutionary history (Stake, 2004; Tummolini & Castelfranchi, 2011; Tummolini, 
Scorolli, & Borghi, 2013). Experimental studies and behavioral observations on animals 
show that in several species, individuals are able to identify and respect others-
ownership when it is signaled by physical contact or proximity; an individual can 
indeed maintain its possession regardless of which other individuals are present 
(Kummer & Cords, 1991; Russ, Comins, Smith, & Hauser, 2010; Sigg & Falett, 1985). 
It has been suggested that the general rule that enables individuals to retain their 
property is the rule of prior possession: the first individual to be in physical possession 
of a resource is the one that retains ownership; the late-comer is the one that respects the 
first-possessor’s ownership (Kummer, 1991; Maynard Smith & Parker, 1976). This 
strategy allows animals to allocate resources minimizing the costs of a fight. A more 
detailed description of studies conducted on animals will be presented later. 
The prior possession rule, also known as the first-possessor heuristic, is a powerful 
construct for the human species as well. In the absence of further information, people 
tend to attribute the ownership of an object to the first possessor they have seen it with; 
evidence of this behavior can be found very early during development (Friedman & 
Neary, 2008; Friedman, Neary, Defeyter, & Malcolm, 2011; Friedman, Van de 
Vondervoort, Defeyter, & Neary, 2013). Behaviors and judgments arising from an 
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intuitive use of the prior possession rule are evidence of the important role played by 
spatiotemporal cues of possession in ownership attribution, both in young children and 
later in adult life (Blake & Harris, 2011). 
Recently, researchers have investigated how other people’s property is represented from 
a social affordance perspective, specifically how awareness of others-ownership affects 
our judgments and our motor behavior during object-interaction. Results from these 
studies demonstrate that: (a) perceptual cues such as physical proximity and object 
interaction play an important role in ownership attribution; (b) others-ownership 
awareness influences the kinematic patterns associated with hand–object interactions; 
(c) our motor behavior changes depending on the final goal of the action (i.e., giving vs 
getting an object) and the object location (self- vs other-peripersonal space) (Constable 
et al., 2011, 2014; Scorolli, Borghi, & Tummolini, 2015; Scorolli et al., 2014). 
To my knowledge, this methodological approach has not yet been adopted in order to 
investigate ownership cognition from a developmental perspective. As mentioned 
earlier, it has been argued that an early understanding of others-ownership is primarily 
based on the visual association between individuals and objects (Friedman, 2008; 
Friedman & Neary, 2008). However, no recent studies have investigated how this 
perceptual information is processed and translated into motor behaviors associated with 
object-interaction. The only observational study to address this question in infants has 
been conducted by Hay and colleagues on dyads of 6-month-olds (D. F. Hay et al., 
1983). The authors find that, when two infants touch the same toy, in the majority of 
cases the original holder (the first who touched the toy) is the one that retains 
possession, while the other infant withdraws their hand. They conclude that already at 
this age infants might be sensitive to others’ possession and that their interaction with 
objects is affected by the presence of another infant. 
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In developmental research, studies on children’s others-ownership understanding have 
mainly focused on the notions of rights associated with the use and transfer of owned 
objects. The most commonly used technique is based on explicit measures of ownership 
comprehension from a third party perspective (i.e., children are presented with verbal 
stories or vignettes representing object ownership interactions between characters, and 
later they are asked to attribute ownership to one of the characters, or to judge their 
behavior). Other authors have exploited non-verbal measures of ownership awareness, 
like spontaneous protests against property rights violation  or they infer ownership 
awareness through implicit measure of social evaluation (Hamlin & Wynn, 2011; Vaish, 
Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009). Results from these studies show differences in the ages 
at which children exhibit some degree of ownership understanding and this seems to 
depend on the methodology used. In verbal studies, for example, the age of evaluation 
of ownership rights transgressions is higher than in studies exploiting implicit measures. 
Thus, the lack of evidence of ownership awareness in younger children may indeed be 
due to their incapacity to communicate or react on norm violations. At the same time, it 
is possible that children lack the motivation to intervene when they are not directly 
involved in the ownership relationship. One of the open questions is whether prior to the 
emergence of productive language abilities and prior to the explicit mastery of the 
concepts of property rights, infants have an implicit and intuitive knowledge about 
ownership. 
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Origins of ownership rights 
Some researchers ascribe the origins of ownership rights exclusively to the realm of 
human inventions (Bentham,1914; Kalish & Anderson, 2011; Rakoczy & Schmidt, 
2013). Others recognize a continuum with our evolutionary past, suggesting that the 
sense of ownership, and precursors of ownership rights, can be found in the behavior of 
many other animal species (Brosnan, 2011; Ellis, 1985; Gintis, 2007; Krier, 2009; 
Stake, 2004). In this section, I will focus on the second hypothesis, presenting evidence 
that suggests the importance of biological evolution behind the emergence of private 
property rights. 
The economist Harold Demsetz argued that, in human societies, a system of property 
rights is more likely to emerge when the benefits that derive from that economic system 
outweigh the costs imposed on all individuals involved (Demsetz, 1967). For example, 
when the costs of overhunting caused by fur trade outweighed the benefits in some 
tribes of American Indians, they decided to turn from a shared use of the land to a 
system of property rights where each family owned a piece of land for their exclusive 
use. The reasoning that resulting from a particular environmental pressure the ratio 
between costs and benefits leads human groups to adopt a specific socio-economic 
strategy strongly resembles the socio-ecological explanation of some behavioural 
adaptations in non-human animals. Indeed, in several species, ecological conditions and 
species-specific needs have led to evolutionary adaptations such as having an exclusive 
territory or hoarding food in cache sites. In these species, individuals or groups exhibit 
behaviours with the goal to define and defend their property. At the same time, they 
recognize and respect property of others. As previously said, it has been suggested that 
the general rule that enables individuals to retain their property is the rule of prior 
possession. According to the rule, “the resource falls to the individual who had it first, 
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and the late-comer respects the owner’s control over it” (Kummer, 1991). This rule has 
been formalized as part of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) that prevents 
individuals to continuously fight over resources, minimizing the costs associated with 
fights (Maynard Smith and Parker, 1976; see also Stake, 2004). Observational studies 
show that as soon as property has been settled, individuals are more likely to retain it 
without actual fighting, and they are more likely to win a fight against an intruder 
(Davies, 1978; Krebs, 1982; Nelson, 1984). For example, Davies (1978) observed that 
speckled wood butterflies (Pararge aegeria) exploit a first-in-time rule for the 
possession of sunspot: the first individual to touch the sunspot is the one that fights 
harder to maintain possession and usually wins the contest with the intruder. 
The rule of prior possession can be applied to territories, harems and food- or non-food-
objects. Experiments and behavioural observations on non-human primates show that, 
in general, the event of taking an object possessed by another individual is extremely 
rare (Gintis, 2007) and that individuals are able to identify and respect others-ownership 
when it is signalled by contact or proximity. However, it should be noted that this rule 
takes different forms depending on the species, the identity of the involved parties, and 
the attributes of the owned object. In some primates, visual cues like physical contact 
and proximity are not the only ones used to determine possession and property; 
olfactory and auditory signals can play a role as well. Basing on her research on white-
faced capuchin monkeys (Cebus capucinus), Gros-Louis (2004) assumed that food-
associated calls may function to signal food possession, regulating inter-individual 
spacing and reducing the likelihood of aggressions. 
In experimental studies, a typical measure of respect for possession is the probability of 
a dominant individual refraining from taking an object from a subordinate. In 
hamadryad baboons (Papio hamadryas), for example, it has been noted that proximity 
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can be sufficient to draw respect for possession; however, between dyads of monkeys, 
the likelihood of maintaining possession depended also on the gender of the involved 
parties and on their relative hierarchical distance (Sigg & Falett, 1985). In another study 
involving long-tailed macaques (Macaca fascicularis), researchers observed that 
proximity or physical contact with an object were not sufficient for others to respect 
possession; in this species, individuals respected ownership when the owner was also 
able to carry the object. In case of attempted taking by a dominant individual, the 
probability to retain possession increased when the subordinate owner screamed, 
attracting support from other group members. Authors proposed third-party intervention 
as evidence of the existence of possession-related norms in this species (Kummer & 
Cords, 1991). In a different experimental setting, Russ and colleagues (2010) studied 
how free-ranging rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) reacted to different cues of 
possession expressed by a human competitor. When monkeys had to choose between 
two food options, they avoided to take the resource that was in proximity or physical 
contact with the experimenter, even when the connection was made through a rope 
attached to the food. The attentional state of the human competitor was also a strong cue 
inhibiting food acquisition. 
In some species, the behavioural repertoire concerning possession and object interaction 
can be context dependent. For example, individuals can adopt a flexible behaviour 
depending on their proximate motivations and on inter-individual relationship. An 
example of a particular context in which rules of possession are subverted is social play 
that involves objects. Major evidence of this behaviour has been found in primates, 
canids and birds (Bekoff & Byers, 1998). Social object play is presumed to have 
immediate and long-term effects on social skills and species-specific abilities like 
environmental exploration, predation, and tool use abilities (Burghardt, 2005). 
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Interestingly, it has been observed that, during play, respect for possession disappears 
and the roles of owner and non-owner are repeatedly reversed. Moreover, in this context 
the competition for an object does not lead to serious aggressive escalations, although 
this aspect could vary from one species to another.  
Another example of behavioural flexibility is represented by tolerance toward transfer 
of possession in circumstances that involve food or tools (Pruetz & Lindshield, 2012; 
Stevens & Gilby, 2004). Expression of tolerance depends on the species, and it is 
strongly affected by kinship relationship; nevertheless, there are many evidences of this 
behaviour even between unrelated subjects. In primates, examples of tolerated transfers 
of food from the hands, or even the mouth, of one individual to another have been 
observed both in apes and in monkeys (Brown et al., 2004; Feistner & McGrew, 1989; 
Kasper et al, 2008). Tolerance, however, seems to be higher toward infants and young 
individuals and, in some cases, only certain kinds of food are shared that are highly 
nutritious or difficult to obtain (Rapaport, 2006; Silk, 1979). 
This body of evidence seems to support the idea that a sense of ownership and the 
origin of ownership rights are rooted in our evolutionary history and have a pre-cultural 
basis. Stake (2004; see also Litwinski, 1942) affirms that humans are equipped with a 
property instinct and that some fundamental principles of property are ingrained in 
human behaviour by the virtue of evolution. According to this theory, the mechanisms 
dealing with ownership recognition are hard-wired in the human brain and humans are 
adapted to respecting others’ possession.  
Another source of evidence that supports the existence of a property instinct is provided 
by research on human infants’ behaviour. As previously said, the majority of 
experimental studies dealing with ownership cognition have been conducted on children 
and not on infants. Nevertheless, some indirect sources of evidence seem to suggest 
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that, from a very young age, infants are equipped with the ability to recognize physical 
cues of possession and build a representation of possessive relationship in complex 
social contexts. A detailed description of these studies will be presented in the next 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2  
Human reasoning seems to be guided by the presence of a system of “core principles” 
dealing with important aspects of the external world and related both to the physical and 
the social domain (Carey, 2009; Spelke & Kinzler, 2007). This core knowledge appears 
to be in place from birth, and to be shared with other animal species (Vallortigara, 
2012). In this chapter, I will describe the subcomponents that lead to an abstract 
representation of others’ possession. Then, I will provide evidence that infants possess 
the cognitive abilities required for the understanding of these subcomponents. 
Ultimately, I will discuss the hypothesis that infants are equipped with a core sense of 
possession and that they are able to build a representation of possessive relationship in 
complex social contexts.  
 
Representation of others’ possession 
Possession is an abstract property that arises from a specific set of elements 
characterizing a relationship between (at least) one subject and an object. A 
comprehensive representation of possession depends on the processing of some spatial 
cues and dynamic events occurring between the subject(s) and the object.  
Spatial cues that can elicit a representation of possession are physical contact and 
physical proximity between subject and object (Kummer & Cords, 1991; Sigg & Falett, 
1985). The contact condition between a subject and an object is typically represented by 
a direct physical connection between the body of the subject (for example a hand) and 
the object or part of it. Nevertheless, in some cases, the connection could be mediated 
through another element, for example a rope (Russ et al., 2010). The proximity 
condition between the subject and the object occurs when the object is located in the 
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peripersonal space of the subject, so that it can be reached and grasped by the subject. 
The peripersonal space can be extended by a tool (Maravita & Iriki, 2004).  
Spatial cues alone, however, are not always sufficient in eliciting a representation of 
possession. Another basic component that allows people to detect possession is direct 
control. Control can be defined as the power exerted by the subject over the fate of the 
object. At a basic level, a subject is considered to be in control of an object if the 
object’s motion depends on the subject’s actions and decisions (Premack & Premack, 
1995). 
Until here, I presented possession as a spatial and dynamic relationship between a 
subject and an object where possession of an object is described as a status, but not 
necessarily as the goal of the subject’s actions. There are indeed contexts where 
possession of an object can be viewed both as a status and as a goal. For example, when 
we observe a subject pick up and move objects from one location to another, during this 
specific period the subject is in possession of the objects. The goal of the action though 
is changing the objects’ location. The possessive relation between subject and object is 
a necessary condition in order to fulfill the action, but not the overarching goal of the 
action. Instead, if we observe a subject collect objects and stack them close to his body, 
or put them into a close container, possession can be assumed to be the goal of the 
subject’s actions. 
A component that expands the representation of possession and leads to a representation 
of possession as a goal is the investment of effort in gaining and maintaining possession 
of objects. Effort is expressed by the time and the physical energy invested by a subject 
in the act of acquiring, maintaining and, possibly, defending their possession.  
Even if possession can be described as a dyadic subject-object relationship, a complete 
representation of possession emerges only when we consider a context that involves 
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more than one subject. Several authors have indeed argued that possessive relationships 
are necessarily triadic (social), involving at least the presence of a person, an object, and 
another person. According to this view, possession exists only when it is recognized by 
others (Snare, 1972). Only inside a social context, certain important properties of the 
concept of possession can emerge, such as the power to exclude others from the object 
of possession. The power to exclude others derives from the power to control the object.  
Another emerging property of possession that arises within a social context is that 
possession can be transferred between subjects. Transfer of possession is the 
counterpart of exclusion, and similarly derives from control as well. An event of 
transfer can be described as the reallocation of an object from one subject to another. 
The nature of the transfer, however, varies depending on the circumstances and 
execution of the reallocation. Imagine a three-component context composed of two 
subjects and an object, one of the subjects being in possession of the object (the subject 
is in contact with the object and is able to control its motion). If the subject that 
performs the transfer of the object is the possessor, the process could be described as a 
giving-action. If the other subject is responsible for the transfer, it could be described as 
a taking-action. Giving- and taking-actions are therefore object-mediated interactions 
between subjects (Tatone, Geraci, & Csibra, 2015). Nevertheless, other situations exist 
where reallocation of possession occurs without a direct interaction between subjects. 
For example, in case the possessor relinquishes its possession first, followed by the 
second subject taking possession of the object, a two-steps transfer of possession 
without direct interaction occurs. 
As demonstrated, possession seems to be a high-level cognitive construct that involves 
multiple representations. It requires the ability to (a) differentiate between animate 
subjects and inanimate objects, (b) detect and interpret their relative spatial 
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relationships, (c) encode object-directed actions, and (d) encode object-mediated 
interactions between subjects. The ability to identify these components and processes is 
a necessary prerequisite in order to identify possession and transfers of possession. 
Despite this apparent complexity, detection of possession and transfer of possession in 
humans and non-human animals is a process that occurs in a rapid and automatic way. 
A body of evidence shows how animals rely on contact, proximity and direct control to 
recognize and respect others’ possession. This behavior is typical for the human species 
as well: in several contexts of everyday life, possessive relationships shape our 
interactions with objects and other individuals even if we are not aware of it. In the 
absence of explicit information, moreover, adults tend to base their attribution of 
ownership on perceptual cues of possession. Ultimately, developmental studies show 
that, from a very young age on, children are able to make inferences about ownership by 
basing their judgments on spatiotemporal cues of possession. Collectively, these 
findings provide evidence for a biological foundation of ownership that, at a basic level, 
is based on the social cognitive ability to encode possessive relationships. It is indeed 
likely that early precursors of this ability can be found in the behavior of human infants 
as well. Following, I will present evidence that human infants are able to detect the 
elementary subcomponents of possessive relationship.  
Psychological reasoning in early infancy 
 At the beginning of the 1980s, researchers began to employ looking-time methods to 
explore infants’ cognitive abilities (Baillargeon, Spelke, & Wasserman, 1985; Kellman 
& Spelke, 1983; Leslie, 1984; for a review, see Baillargeon, Li, Gertner, & Wu, 2011). 
One of the most used looking-time techniques was the violation-of-expectation (VOE) 
method that relies on infants’ tendency to look longer at events that violate their 
expectations and thus are inconsistent with their knowledge about a specific 
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phenomenon. Thanks to this and other visual behavior approaches, researchers have 
provided evidence that young infants possess sophisticated cognitive competences 
regarding both the physical and the psychological world. A number of experimental 
works confirm the existence of a core foundation for objects, numbers, spatial 
relationships, events representation and for the social domain. For example, infants 
show preference for direct gaze and biological motion already from birth (Farroni, 
Csibra, Simion, & Johnson, 2002; Simion, Regolin, & Bulf, 2008) and they are able to 
discriminate between sets of elements of different magnitude (Izard, Sann, Spelke & 
Streri, 2009). Infants can represent occluded objects (Baillargeon, 2008; Bremner, 
Slater, & Johnson, 2015); they have expectations about when an object will fall because 
it lacks of support (Needham & Baillargeon, 1993); and they can recognize and 
categorize the spatial relations between objects (Casasola & Cohen, 2002; Quinn, 
Norris, Pasko, Schmader, & Mash, 1999). 
Regarding the comprehension of events, the seminal works of Heider and Simmel 
(1944) and Michotte (1963) demonstrated that simple visual displays involving abstract 
entities moving and interacting with each other could give rise to percepts with high-
level properties such as social and physical causality. In these experiments, adults 
watched video scenarios where two-dimensional geometrical figures moved on a screen 
following specific sequential patterns (Fig.1). After having watched the videos, 
participants were asked to describe and interpret the scenes. Authors showed that 
observers systematically tended to attribute to the figures specific roles, causal 
properties and mental states. Such interpretation did not depend on the perceptual 
qualities of figures (shape, dimension or color), but it was based on specific kinematic 
information such as timing, velocity and variation in the spatiotemporal contingency 
between the moving objects.  
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Fig. 1  
Some sequential frames from a dynamic 
display of the type used by Heider & Simmel 
to demonstrate perceptual animacy.  
Observers interpret this display as a chasing 
event where the big red triangle chases the 
small yellow triangle and the green circle.  
(Adapted from Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000) 
 
 
The same approach has been adopted in the area of social cognitive development, in 
order to shed light on the emergence of socially relevant mental representations and 
processes such as agency, intentionality, social relationship and social judgments (see 
Baillargeon et al. 2015, for an extensive review). In many of these experimental studies, 
infants are presented with video scenarios showing interactions between entities. An 
outstanding body of evidence shows that the dynamic properties of the moving figures 
lead to a representation of them as either physical inanimate objects or as intentional (or 
psychological) agents. For example, agents’ movement appears to be self-propelled 
(i.e., they are capable of autonomous motion) and biological (non-rigid, irregular), while 
objects’ motion requires external causes and appears to be more rigid and mechanical. 
Agents moreover produce actions that could be described as goal-directed and that are 
guided by a principle of rationality. This means, for example, that agents’ actions 
should be consistent with their goals and dispositions (consistency principle) and agents 
should be as much efficient as possible in achieving their goals (efficiency principle). 
Several works show how infants rely on dynamic features and on psychological 
principles to create representations of agents, attribute intentions to their actions and 
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predict their behavior. In a seminal work, Gergely and colleagues (Gergely, Nádasdy, 
Csibra, & Biro, 1995) demonstrated that by 9 months of age infants are able to view an 
abstract entity as an agent and attribute to it a specific goal (i.e., reach a target). Infants 
specifically expect the agent to use the shortest possible path to reach a target, in 
accordance with the efficiency principle (Fig.2).  
 
 
Fig. 2 Stimuli by Gergely et al. (1995) 
During the habituation phase, infants see 
an agent jumping over an obstacle in 
order to reach a target.  
During the test phase, the obstacle is 
removed and infants watch two test 
events: the old (indirect and inefficient) 
action and the new (direct and efficient) 
action. 
 
 
In the same period, with an elegant set of experiments, Amanda Woodward 
demonstrated that infants by 9 months of age are able to encode agents’ behavior in 
terms of goals (or preferences) and they expect the agent to maintain the goal, in 
accordance with the consistency principle (Woodward, 1998) (Fig. 3). 
  
 
Fig. 3  
Woodward paradigm, human condition. 
During the habituation phase, infants see an actor repeatedly reach for and 
grasp one of two toys. During the test phase, position of toys is inverted and 
infants watch two test events: a new goal event and a new path event. 
New goal event: the actor grasps a different toy than she had during 
habituation.  
New path event: the actor reaches to a different location for the same toy that 
she had during habituation.  
Adapted from Sommerville et al., 2003 
 
29 
 
 
Another property that characterizes agents is that their behavior can be affected at 
distance and that they can act to influence another agent from a distance (Leslie, 1994). 
Developmental research has demonstrated that infants are able to represent dynamic 
interactions between agents and understand their roles in specific contexts. For example, 
very young infants prefer coordinated and interacting moving shapes to randomly 
moving stimuli (Rochat, Morgan, & Carpenter, 1997). Other studies provide evidence 
that, toward the end of the first year, infants begin to encode complex interactive 
schemata such as chasing (Schlottmann, Surian, & Ray, 2009; Southgate & Csibra, 
2009) or helping (Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007).  
 
Representation of possession in infants 
 In 1995, Premack and Premack developed a theory about the origins of human social 
competences as a domain-specific module (Premack & Premack, 1995). According to 
the theory, social competence consists of three units. One module (intentional) allows 
infants to distinguish between animate and inanimate objects. One module (social) 
allows infants to interpret agents’ actions. One module (theory of mind) allows the 
attribution of mental states to agents. The social module allows infants to understand 
that agents’ actions are goal-directed and that a value (positive or negative) can be 
attributed to them. Moreover, three secondary properties identify intentional 
agents: they reciprocate value, join groups, and take possessions. Possession, indeed, is 
described as a fundamental element of the social system and its recognition depends on 
the ability to identify connection and co-movement of two objects, and their relative 
power. Thus, when a scene depicts two entities and one of those controls the 
movements of the other, a representation of possession arises. 
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In the previous chapter, I briefly illustrated that infants are able to differentiate between 
animate agents and inanimate objects, attribute goals to the agents’ actions, interpret the 
meaning associated with a complex pattern of events, and possess expectations about 
social interactions among agents. Following, I will describe representative studies 
where infants are presented with video scenarios showing agents-objects interactions. In 
these works, possessive relationships and transfers of objects between characters play a 
relevant role in the chain of events. Authors assume that infants have an implicit 
knowledge about these constructs. 
In a study about prelinguistic events representation, Gordon (2003) investigated infants’ 
sensitivity to the relevance of an argument inside the structure of a specific event. For 
example, the three arguments of a giving action are: the giver, the recipient, and the 
object. All of the arguments are essential for a representation of a giving action; the 
subtraction of any one argument would cause the meaning of the event to change. In the 
experiment, infants were habituated to scenarios showing a three-argument event (a girl 
gave a toy to a boy) and a two-argument event (a girl hugged a boy while carrying a 
toy). Later, infants saw an old test event identical to the one seen before, and a new test 
event showing the same event (giving or hugging) without the toy. Results show that 
between 8 and 10 months of age, infants expect the argument object (the toy) to be 
present in the giving event, but not in the hugging event, showing recovery of attention 
for the new test event in the giving condition. These results clearly show that infants, 
toward the end of the first year, are able to understand the meaning of a triadic 
interaction entailing transfer of possession from one subject to another, and the essential 
function of the object in the structure of the event. 
As mentioned before, the nature of a transfer of possession varies depending on the 
circumstances and execution of the reallocation (i.e., giving, taking, transfer of 
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possession without direct interaction).  The difference between giving and taking has 
been widely investigated in a recent study by Tatone, Geraci, and Csibra (2015) (Fig.4). 
Authors demonstrated that 12-month-old infants encode abstract object-transfer events 
between agents differently. Importantly, results show that infants represent a giving 
action as a three-argument social event including two animate elements (an active agent, 
the giver, and a passive agent, the recipient) and an object. On the other hand, infants 
interpret a taking action as a two-argument non-social event. In the case of taking, 
indeed, infants’ representation seems to include the active agent (taker) and the object, 
but not the passive social element (the previous possessor of the taken object). Authors 
hypothesize that humans possess an action schema for giving specific for representing 
social interactions involving transfer of objects. The act of taking in the demonstrated 
situation is instead encoded as an object-directed event. 
 
 
Fig. 4 Selected frames from Tatone et al. (2015). Familiarization phase: infants see a Giving event where 
the blue square gives an object to the green circle or a Taking event where the red triangle takes an 
object from the green circle. 
 
The difference between a giving event and a transfer of possession without direct 
interaction between agents has been addressed in a study by Schoppner, Sodian, and 
Pauen (2006). In their work, authors analyzed infants’ ability to encode action roles in a 
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three-argument interaction involving two agents and an object. Nine to 12-month-old 
infants were habituated to events of a puppet giving a flower to another puppet. During 
the test phase, the positions of giver and taker were changed, and infants were presented 
with movies showing role reversal or direction reversal events. Results show that from 
10 months, infants are able to encode the roles of giver and taker, differentiating 
between role reversal and change in the perceptual features of the event. In another 
condition, infants were presented with an event where the previously described 
interaction was divided into two parts: first, one of the puppets dropped the flower and 
then the other puppet picked it up. In this case, infants did not show a preference for one 
of the test phases (role reversal versus direction reversal). The combined results 
demonstrate that, by the age of 10 months, infants are sensitive to the give-and-take 
exchange in terms of intentional relation between agent and recipient. They do not 
however interpret the transfer of possession without direct interaction as a social event 
occurring between the two agents.  
Possessive relationships and transfer of objects also play a central role in experiments 
dealing with social evaluations and sensitivity to fairness.  Geraci and Surian (2011) and 
Meristo and Surian (2013) for example, were interested in infants’ sensitivity to 
distributive justice and tested their reaction to equal and unequal distributions of 
resources. In both experiments, infants were presented with movies showing a fair and 
an unfair distributive event. In the first case, infants saw an agent (the distributor) 
distributing objects equally between two recipients, in the second case only one of the 
recipients received the objects. Results from Meristo and Surian (2013) show that 10-
month-old infants are sensitive to unequal resource distribution and expect an unfair 
distributor not to be reciprocated by a third-party. Results (looking time measures and 
manual choices) from Geraci and Surian (2011) show that infants by 16 months 
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evaluate agents on the basis of their distributive actions, preferring the fair to the unfair 
distributor. These findings provide further evidence that infants are able to encode 
transfers of objects between agents and keep track of the amount of objects transferred. 
Moreover, the attribution of valence (positive/negative) to the distributive action 
(equal/unequal) suggests that infants interpret transfers of objects to have a beneficial 
effect on the recipient and, in general, possession of objects as an advantage. 
Attribution of valence to actions and social evaluation of agents are also the focus of a 
work by Hamlin and Wynn (2011). In one of their experiments, 3 and 5-month-old 
infants were presented with a live puppet scenario with three characters. At the 
beginning, one character played with a ball and accidentally dropped it.  At this point, 
the ball was either given back to the previous possessor by a second character (the 
giver), or taken away by the third one (the taker). In both cases, the first possessor 
expressed the will to have the ball back. Results (looking times and manual choices) 
show that infants evaluate positively the giver and negatively the taker, suggesting that 
they attribute a social meaning to the taking action and to the restitution event, even 
when transfers of objects between characters do not occur through direct interaction. 
Evidence for infants’ ability to build a high-level interpretation of possessive 
relationships emerges from a study by Mascaro & Csibra (2012). In their work, 
researchers were interested in infants’ capacity to represent a social hierarchy, 
differentiate between dominant and subordinate individuals, and expect the dominance 
relation to be stable across contexts. Infants from nine to 15 months of age were 
presented with events where two different geometrical entities competed to reach a goal, 
and one of the agents (the dominant) prevailed over the other (the subordinate). One of 
the conflicting situations considered by authors was an event representing competition 
over objects’ possession. At the beginning, only one agent was present on the scene and 
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small objects fell from above on the center of the screen. Infants watched the agent 
repeatedly collecting the objects and amassing them on one side of the screen. 
Subsequently, the other agent entered the scene. At this point, the two agents 
approached the object at the same time, and the newcomer prevailed over the first agent 
(Fig. 5). Results from this study demonstrate that infants from 12 months are able to 
differentiate between dominant and subordinate individuals; from 15 months, they are 
able to generalize the dominance relation across contexts. The finding that infants 
mentally represent social dominance provides evidence that they represent possession of 
object as a goal: they understand that agents pursued their goal through direct control 
and collection of objects; they understand that the power of one agent to exclude the 
other from possession is an expression of dominance. 
 
  
 
Fig. 5 A frame from the dynamic display showed by 
Mascaro & Csibra (2012) 
Infants first see a red triangle collecting objects and 
pushing them on its side of the screen. Subsequently, a 
blue circle enters the scene. In the current frame, the 
blue circle (dominant) prevails over the red triangle 
(subordinate) in collecting the object. 
 
 
Taken together, results from these experiments provide evidence that infants are able to: 
(1) build a representation of possession based on available spatial and dynamic cues, (2) 
differentiate between different kinds of transfers of possession between agents, (3) 
ascribe social valence (positive or negative) to agents performing object-mediated 
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interactions, (4) interpret possession of objects as an advantage, and (5) understand 
when possession of objects is the goal of an agent’s actions. 
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PART 2 – EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES 
 
The general aim of this research is to examine the cognitive bases of sense of ownership 
and to explore how the understanding of the social norms concerning ownership evolves 
during the first year of life. In two experimental studies, I examined (a) infants’ ability 
to identify spatial-temporal cues of possession such as subject-object physical contact 
and proximity, actual control and first possession, (b) infants’ ability to recognize 
violation of possession and to differentiate between a taking action (a three-argument 
social event including an active agent, the taker, an object, and a passive agent, the 
original possessor of the object) and an acquisition event (a two-argument non-social 
event including an active agent and an object), and (c) infants’ ability to respect others’ 
possession. 
Several experimental works have shown that infants seem to possess sophisticated 
social competence when their abilities are measured through passive experimental tasks 
(infants observe others interacting but do not participate in these interactions 
themselves). Nevertheless, when their social abilities were measured through first-party 
tasks (the infants are directly involved in social interactions) infants failed to produce 
behaviors consistent with their knowledge (Baillargeon & Scott, 2014) A possible 
explanation could be that evaluating interactions between third-party individuals 
involves cognitive mechanisms that are partly different from those involved during 
active participation. Thus, a part of the theoretical and empirical research on 
developmental processes emphasized the role of participatory aspects of social 
understanding and encourages executing research via adopting both classical visual 
paradigms and behavioral measures where the child is directly involved in social 
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interactions (Allen & Bickhard, 2013; De Jaegher, Di Paolo, & Gallagher, 2010; De 
Jaegher, 2009; Schmidt & Sommerville, 2011).  
Following this advice, a key goal of this research was to examine ownership cognition 
adopting two different methodological approaches: a classical visual paradigm where 
the infant was observing a subject-object interaction (Study 1) and an interactive 
paradigm where the infant was directly involved in a subject-object interaction (Study 
2).  
 In Study 1, we analyzed infants’ social-cognitive abilities from a third-person 
perspective. Six and 9 months old infants were presented with video animations 
displaying object-oriented scenarios involving social interactions between agents. 
Infants’ spontaneous visual behavior (looking time) was measured. 
In Study 2, we focused on ownership cognition by analyzing infants’ behavior from a 
first-person perspective. Six and 9-month-olds were involved in a social interaction 
involving two objects, one of which was possessed by the experimenter. Infants’ 
preference (manual choice) towards one of the objects was coded. 
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STUDY 1 
 
 Introduction 
Several developmental studies on ownership cognition have focused on the emerging 
ability to evaluate property transgressions such as alteration or destruction of others’ 
property, illegitimate acquisition (theft) or no-restitution. As previously said, research 
on this topic has mostly been carried out using third-party tasks, where participants are 
passive observers of third-party interactions involving objects. 
In children studies, participants were typically presented with verbal stories, vignettes or 
live puppet scenarios representing ownership rights violations and later asked to 
attribute ownership to one of the characters or to judge their behavior (Blake & Harris, 
2009; Kim & Kalish, 2009; Vaish, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2010). The explicit 
methodology used in those paradigms (verbal attributions of ownership and evaluations 
of characters and events) requires high-level language skills (comprehension and 
production), socio-moral reasoning, and perspective-taking abilities. Overall, there is 
general agreement that around 5 years of age, children possess a relatively mature 
understanding of the normative obligations associated with objects ownership (F 
Rossano, Fiedler, & Tomasello, 2015). 
Children’s understanding of ownership transgressions seems however to emerge earlier 
when investigated through implicit (non-verbal) measures (Kanngiesser & Hood, 2014; 
Rossano et al., 2011; Vaish et al., 2009, 2011). In these studies, rather than 
administering explicit interviews, children were directly involved in interactive 
paradigms and their spontaneous reactions towards ownership transgressions were 
observed. Objects ownership, in some cases, was displayed via physical possession and 
verbal information (children saw the victims of the transgression in physical possession 
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of the object and heard them talk about their property) (Rossano et al., 2011; Vaish et 
al., 2009). In other cases, the ownership relationship between a subject and an object 
emerged from the investment of effort into creating that object (Kanngiesser & Hood, 
2014; Vaish et al., 2009, 2011). Results from these experiments show that very young 
children emotionally react against transgressions of others’ ownership rights. Rossano 
and colleagues (2011), for example, showed that 3-year-olds spontaneously protest 
against property rights violation when they see a puppet stealing or throwing away 
someone else’s pieces of clothes. Similarly, Vaish and colleagues (2011) found that 3-
year-olds react during the destruction of a newly made object (a picture or a clay 
sculpture) and behave prosocially towards the victim of the transgression (but see 
Kanngiesser & Hood, 2014 for contrasting results with 3-year-olds). Ultimately, Vaish 
et al. (2009) showed that even toddlers (from 18 months of age) exhibit prosocial 
behavior towards the victim of theft and property destruction, even in the absence of the 
victim’s emotional reaction upon being harmed. Taken together, these findings suggest 
that, from a very young age, children recognize the ownership rights of others, enforce 
third-party ownership rights by reacting and protesting against property transgressions, 
and behave prosocially towards the victim showing affective perspective-taking and a 
sense of restorative justice (see also Riedl, Jensen, Call, & Tomasello, 2015). 
Nevertheless, from the results of these experiments, it is not completely clear which one 
of the ownership transgressions children are reacting to, because the stealing events 
were often followed by harmful events involving the object being destroyed or 
discarded, and these forms of transgression have often been analyzed together (see 
Rossano et al., 2011 for an exception). However, in none of these cases, children have 
been exposed to events where the object is taken directly from the hands of the 
possessor, and violations of ownership have never been compared to violations of 
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possession. It is likely that the emotional reaction caused by a violation of possession 
event would be stronger and, possibly, would emerge earlier compared to emotional 
reaction caused by violations of ownership. 
Indirect evidence of infants’ ability to encode others-ownership transgressions is limited 
to the work of Hamlin and Wynn (2011; see also Hamlin, Wynn, Bloom, & Mahajan, 
2011), and, to some extent, to the work of Tatone and colleagues (2015). As previously 
mentioned, Hamlin and Wynn tested three and 5-month-olds’ evaluation of a 
prosocial/antisocial event through looking time measures and manual choice. In their 
paradigm, infants saw three puppets on a stage, one of them playing with a ball. 
Subsequently, the puppet accidentally lost possession of the ball. Depending on which 
one of the other two puppets collected the ball, infants were exposed to a prosocial 
event (the giver puppet returned the lost object to the original possessor) or to an 
antisocial event (the taker puppet did not return the object to the original possessor). In 
this experiment, infants saw a two-step transfer of possession without direct interaction 
between characters (first one puppet relinquished its possession, than a second puppet 
took possession of the object). After its loss, the original possessor of the object showed 
the willingness to have the object back, turning several times towards the second 
possessor and opening its arms “apparently ‘asking’ for the ball back” (Hamlin & 
Wynn, 2011). The ownership transgression was expressed in the form of a no-restitution 
event. Results showed that infants positively evaluated a restitution event (and/or 
negatively evaluated the no-restitution) preferring the prosocial agent to the antisocial 
one.  
According to these results, very young infants seem to encode transfers of possession as 
social events (negative in the case of taking away, positive in the case of giving back) 
even when they do not occur through a direct interaction between subjects. 
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Nevertheless, a possible alternative explanation could be that infants built their 
preference solely on the basis of the positive interaction between the prosocial agent and 
the previous possessor, without attributing any social meaning to the no-restitution 
event. This explanation would be in line with the findings of Tatone et al. (2015). The 
focus of their work was to analyze whether infants encode direct object-transfer events 
occurring between agents (giving and taking) as social events, differentiating them from 
object-directed non-social events (disposing and acquiring). Results from their 
experiments have shown that while infants interpret a giving action as a social event 
involving an object transfer from a giver to a receiver, they do not seem to encode a 
taking action differently from an acquiring event. Authors suggest that infants interpret 
a taking event as an object-directed action where the goal of the agent is the acquisition 
of an object, regardless if possessed or not. The previous possessor of the object is not 
included in the representation. 
However, it is possible that infants need more elements to set up a representation of 
possession in order to build a representation of a taking action as a social event 
occurring between two agents (the original possessor and the taker). A stronger 
representation of possession as a goal (and not just as a status) could emerge, for 
example, if the value associated with the possessed object is explicit or when the cost of 
losing possession of an object is evident. On the one hand, the potential cost of losing 
possession could be expressed by the possessor’s attempt to resist to the taking event, or 
by the emotional distress displayed after the taking event. On the other hand, the 
attribution of value to a possessed object could be elicited, for example, by the 
investment of time and effort in taking possession of that object. 
The aim of the present study was to investigate if infants differentiate between a taking 
action (the acquisition of a possessed object) and the acquisition of a non-possessed 
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object. In order to prompt a representation of possession as a goal, and elicit an 
attribution of value to the possessed object, infants were exposed to a familiarization 
phase showing a first agent repeatedly collecting one of two available objects. 
Subsequently, in a within-subjects design, infants were presented with two test 
conditions: in one of them, a second agent collects the other available object. In the 
other, the second agent steals the object from the first possessor. Importantly, during 
testing infants could see that both of the options (taking the possessed object and 
acquiring the non-possessed object) were possible and equally feasible to achieve. The 
evolutionary approach to the origins of ownership rights suggests that first possession 
rule and respect for possession are parts of an evolutionary stable strategy that 
modulates the interactions between individuals over resources under certain 
circumstances (Maynard Smith & Parker, 1976). If a resource is abundant, the most 
efficient (and less risky) way to exploit it is take possession of the available part, and 
leave the possessed part to the original possessors. According to the evolutionary 
approach, humans (as well as other animals) are predisposed to recognize the 
observable characteristics of ownership, and respect others’ property is a hardwired 
behavior (Stake, 2004). We hypothesized that if infants expect individuals to act in 
accordance with the first possession rule and respect of possession principle, they would 
look longer at events showing violation of possession, compared to events showing the 
acquisition of non-possessed objects.  
As said, the perceptual cues that can elicit a representation of possession are physical 
contact and physical proximity between a subject and an object. Thus, a further goal of 
this study was to investigate whether infants encode a taking event differently 
depending on the available possession cue (contact or proximity).  
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Experiment 1 
The first experiment addressed the question whether 6 and 9-months-old infants 
discriminate between a taking action (the acquisition of a possessed object) and an 
acquiring action (the acquisition of a non-possessed object). Infants were familiarized 
with an agent (the Possessor) collecting one of two available objects. During tests, 
infants watched two different conditions: in the Allowed condition, a second agent (the 
Competitor) collected the other available object. In the Not-allowed condition, the 
Competitor stole the object from the Possessor. If infants encoded the taking action as 
an object-directed action, without including the representation of the previous possessor 
of the object, they would look equally long at the two conditions. Otherwise, if they are 
able to build a representation of possession during the familiarization phase, their gaze 
duration will differ across the two conditions. Our hypothesis was that infants would 
look longer at the Not-allowed condition, where possession was violated. 
Participants 
The study was conducted at the Pediatric Unit of the Hospital of Monfalcone, Italy. 
Sixteen healthy full-term 6-month-old infants (5 girls and 11 boys; age M = 185 days, 
SD = 7) and sixteen healthy full-term 9-month-old infants (5 girls and 11 boys; age M = 
277 days, SD = 9) participated in Experiment 1. Five 6-month-olds were excluded from 
the sample due to inattentiveness; three 9-month-olds were excluded because of 
fussiness (1), experimental error (1), and inattentiveness (1). Infants of the appropriate 
age were recruited for participation through phone calls. Parents gave their informed 
consent before the infants participated. After testing, they received a certificate of 
participation. 
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Setting 
Infants were tested in a quiet, dimly lit room. During test sessions, infants sat on their 
parents’ lap, 50-70 cm away from a 27-inch-monitor used to display the stimuli. The 
parents were asked not to communicate with the infants and not to direct their attention 
in any way during the testing. A hidden camera mounted on the top of the screen filmed 
the infants’ looking behavior. The experimenter was behind a black curtain: from this 
position, she was able to monitor the infants’ looking behavior and to control the stimuli 
presentation. 
Stimuli 
The stimuli were non-verbal colorful 2D animations generated with Synfig Studio 
software. Animations displayed two animated agents (Possessor and Competitor) and 
two unanimated objects. Animated agents were a red and a blue square of the same size, 
provided with eyes (with moving pupils). They moved on a uniform background and 
acted over the objects. Objects were two identical brown circular shapes (hereafter: first 
object and second object) (Fig. 1). All infants were shown a Familiarization phase and a 
Test phase. A short attention-getting animation of a pulsating heart combined with a 
trilling sound was presented before each familiarization and test trial. 
 
 
Fig. 1  
One frame from the stimuli presented in Experiment 
1.The scene displays the two animated agents (a red 
and a blue square provided with eyes: Possessor and 
Competitor respectively) and the two objects (two 
brown circular shapes: first and second object). 
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Familiarization phase 
Infants were presented with four familiarization trials. Each trial started showing the 
two objects positioned in the center of the lower part of the screen. After 0.5 seconds, 
infants saw Possessor and Competitor entering the scene at the same time, respectively 
from the left and the right side of the upper part of the screen. While entering, Possessor 
and Competitor were looking at each other; afterwards, they slowly shifted their gaze 
towards the objects. At this point, the Possessor moved toward the objects, picked up 
the first object and returned with it to the Possessor’s initial position. Due to the absence 
of hands or arms, the acquisition of the object was simply realized through the 
attachment of the object to the agent’s body (Fig. 2, first row). 
To keep the attention of the infant, the trajectory of the possessor toward the objects 
slightly changed for each of the four familiarization trials. The time to reach the object 
and return to the starting position was always identical (8 sec). Each familiarization trial 
lasted 12 seconds. 
Test phase 
All infants saw two different test conditions, two trials per condition: an Allowed 
condition (two trials) and a Not-allowed condition (two trials). In total, infants saw four 
test trials presented in the order ABAB or BABA. All test trials started by showing the 
last frame of the familiarization trials. The scene displayed the Possessor in contact with 
the first object on the upper part of the scene, facing the Competitor, and the second 
object still available on the lower part of the scene. The eyes of the two agents were 
pointed downward. 
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In the Allowed condition, first the two agents looked at each other, then the Competitor 
moved toward the lower part of the screen, picked up the second object and returned to 
the Competitor’s initial position carrying the object (Fig 2, second row).  
In the Not-allowed condition, first the Possessor and the Competitor looked at each 
other, then the Competitor moved toward the Possessor, picked up the first object and 
returned to the Competitor’s initial position carrying the object (Fig 2, third row). Each 
test trial lasted 7.5 seconds.  
Order of test trials (Allowed first vs. Not-allowed first), colors of agents (red vs. blue) 
and side of entry of agents (left vs. right) were fully counterbalanced across participants, 
for a total of 8 different conditions (see Table in Fig. 3) 
 
 
 
Fig.2 Some selected frames from one of the movies presented in Experiment 1. First row: familiarization 
phase. The red agent (the Possessor) collects one of two available objects. Second row: Test phase, 
Allowed condition. The blue agent (the Competitor) collects the other available object. Third row: Test 
phase, Not-allowed condition. The blue agent (the Competitor) steals the object from the Possessor. 
  
47 
 
COLORS OF 
AGENTS 
RED POSSESSOR 
BLUE COMPETITOR 
BLUE POSSESSOR 
RED COMPETITOR 
SIDE OF ENTRY 
OF POSSESSOR 
LEFT RIGHT LEFT RIGHT 
TEST ORDER: 
ALLOWED 
NOT-ALLOWED 
(ABAB) 
1 3 5 7 
TEST ORDER: 
NOT-ALLOWED 
ALLOWED 
(BABA) 
2 4 6 8 
Fig. 3 Conditions of Experiment 1 as a function of counterbalanced variables. Each number represents 
one condition. In condition 1, for example, Possessor was a red square and Competitor a blue square; 
infants saw Possessor enter from the left and Competitor from the right side of the scene; and during test 
phase, infants were first presented with the Allowed condition and then with the Not-allowed condition. 
 
 
Coding 
An off-line frame-by-frame analysis of looking behavior was performed. Blinks were 
considered as look-away if they lasted for more than 0.25 s. To be included in the final 
data analysis, infants had to follow at least 3 familiarization trials and 75% of each test 
trial type to be included in the analysis. The dependent variable was the time the infant 
spent looking at the still picture at the end of each test trial, from the time the 
Competitor returned to the initial position, until the infant looked away for at least 2 
consecutive seconds or 60 second had elapsed. 
Results and discussion 
Infants’ looking times for each age group were analyzed in two separate 2 (test 
conditions type: Allowed vs. Not-allowed) x 2 (order of test trials: Allowed first vs. 
Not-allowed first) x 2 (colors of agents: red or blue) and side of entry of agents (left or 
right) repeated measures analyses of variance (ANOVA). The only significant effect 
found was a significant effect for test condition type in the 9-month-olds group, F(1, 14) 
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= 20.1 , p = .002,  p
2
 = .71. Six-month-old infants did not look reliably longer at test 
trials showing the stealing event (Not-allowed condition) compared to trials showing the 
acquisition of the non-possessed object (Allowed condition) (M = 30.27 s, SD = 17.37 s 
and M = 22.12 s, SD = 13.61 s respectively), t15 = 1.82, p = .08 . By contrast, 9-month-
olds looked significantly longer at test trials showing the Competitor stealing the object 
from the Possessor than at test trials showing the Competitor acquiring the non-
possessed object (M = 20.77 s, SD = 10.40 s and M = 15.74 s, SD = 7.80 s respectively), 
t15 = 2.61, p =.01, effect size: d = .55. Looking times during the test trials are depicted in 
Fig. 4.  
 
 
Fig.4 Average looking times (with standard error bars) during test conditions in the two age groups. 
Asterisks represent statistically significant differences (p = .01) between the two test conditions. 
 
Results from the current experiment show that 9-month-olds, but not 6, look 
significantly differently at the two test conditions. As predicted, they look longer at the 
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event showing violation of possession. These results suggest that older infants encode 
an acquiring event as less salient compared to a taking event showing transfer of 
possession between two agents. A possible alternative explanation, however, is that nine 
months old infants might have simply responded to perceptual aspects that differed 
between the two conditions. Even if the global perceptual complexity (the number of 
elements presented on the scene) was identical, the two conditions differed in the 
number of elements involved in the dynamic event. In the Allowed condition, the 
dynamic event involved two elements: the Competitor and the first object. In the Not-
allowed condition, the dynamic event involved three elements: the Competitor, the 
second object and the Possessor. If infants have a spontaneous preference for dynamic 
events involving a higher number of elements, it is possible that this disposition affected 
the results of Experiment 1. 
Another possible explanation is that 9-month-olds looked longer at the Not-allowed 
condition compared to the Allowed one because of the different conceptual saliency of 
the displayed events. In the Allowed condition, infants saw an object-directed action 
(the Competitor collects an object) while in the Not-allowed condition, they saw an 
object-directed action and an interaction between two agents. If infants have a 
spontaneous preference for events showing social interactions between agents, it is 
possible that this disposition affected the results of Experiment 1. 
In order to exclude both alternative explanations, two control experiments were 
conducted on two separate groups of 9-month-olds: a Non-social Control Test 
(Experiment 2) and a Social Control Test (Experiment 3). 
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Experiment 2- Non-social Control Test 
Results from Experiment 1 demonstrate that 9-months-old infants show longer looking 
times during the Not-allowed condition compared to the Allowed condition. A possible 
explanation of these results is that infants responded to the perceptual difference 
between the two conditions. The current experiment addressed the question whether 
infants have a spontaneous preference for dynamic events involving a higher number of 
elements compared to events with lower complexity. Infants were presented with 
movies showing one animated agent and three inanimate objects. In the Low 
Complexity condition (LC), the dynamic event involved two elements (an agent and an 
object). In the High Complexity condition (HC), the dynamic event involved three 
elements (an agent and two objects). If perceptual differences between the two 
conditions drove infants’ preference in Experiment 1, similar results should be obtained 
here, and infants should prefer the HC condition to the LC one. 
 
Participants 
The study was conducted at the Pediatric Unit of the Hospital of Monfalcone, Italy. 
Sixteen healthy full-term 9-month-old infants (12 girls and 4 boys; age M = 276 days; 
SD = 7) participated in this experiment. Two infants were excluded from the sample 
because of fussiness (1) or inattentiveness (1). Infants of the appropriate age were 
recruited for participation through phone calls. Parents gave their informed consent 
before the infants participated. After testing, they received a certificate of participation. 
Stimuli and procedure 
Animations displayed one animated agent and three unanimated objects. The animated 
agent was a red (or blue) square provided with eyes, identical to the ones used in 
Experiment 1. Objects were two identical brown circular shapes (first object and second 
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object) and another colorful square without eyes (third object). All infants were 
presented with two conditions, two trials per condition: a Low Complexity condition 
(LC) and a High Complexity condition (HC). In total, infants saw four trials presented 
in the order ABAB or BABA.  
Each trial started showing the agent on the upper part of the scene, facing the first and 
the third object in contact with each other. The second object was located on the lower 
part of the scene. At the beginning of each test movie, the eyes of the agent were 
pointed downward (Fig. 5). 
 
 
Fig. 5 First frame from one of the movies presented in 
Experiment 2. The scene displays an animated agent 
(the blue square) and three objects. First and third 
objects are respectively the brown circular shape and 
the red square on the upper part of the scene. Second 
object is the brown circular shape on the lower part of 
the scene. 
 
In the LC condition, infants saw the agent move towards the second object, pick it up 
and return to the agent’s initial position carrying the object (Fig. 6, first row). In the HC 
condition, the agent looked up, than it moved toward the first and third object, picked 
up the first object and returned to the agent’s initial position carrying the object (Fig. 6, 
second row). Each test movie lasted 7.5 seconds.  
Order of trials (LC first vs. HC first), color of the agent (red vs. blue) and side of agent 
(left vs. right) were fully counterbalanced across participants, for a total of 8 different 
conditions. Setting and procedure were identical to Experiment 1. 
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Fig.6 Some selected frames from one of the movies presented in Experiment 2. First row: Low 
Complexity condition. The agent collects the second object. Second row: High Complexity condition. 
The agent moves towards the first and the third object and collects the first object. 
 
Coding 
An off-line frame-by-frame analysis of looking behavior was performed. To be included 
in the analysis, infants had to follow at least 75% of each trial type. The dependent 
variable was the time the infant spent looking at the still picture at the end of each trial, 
from the time the agent returned to its initial position, until the infant looked away for at 
least two consecutive seconds or 60 seconds had elapsed. 
 
Results and discussion 
Preliminary analyses have been run to assess the possible effect of the order of trials 
(LC first vs. HC first), color of the agent (red vs. blue) and side of agent (left vs. right). 
This analysis found neither a significant main effect for any of these variables, nor 
significant interactions with infants’ looking time (all ps > .14). Infants did not show 
significant differences in their looking behavior between the Low complexity condition 
and the High complexity condition (M = 21.92 s SD = 18.46 s and M = 23.62 s SD = 
16.69 s, respectively), t15 =.44, p = .66. Looking times during trials are depicted in Fig. 
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7. Results demonstrated that infants did not show a spontaneous preference for the 
dynamic event involving three elements (High complexity condition) compared to the 
event involving two elements (Low complexity condition). This finding seems to 
exclude the possibility that results found in Experiment 1 were due to perceptual 
differences between the two conditions. 
 
 
Fig. 7 Average looking times (with standard error bars) to the Low and to the High complexity 
conditions. 
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 Experiment 3 - Social Control Test 
Results from experiment 2 (Non-social Control Test) show that infants do not seem to 
prefer dynamic events involving a higher number of elements compared to dynamic 
events with lower complexity. However, another possibility is that infants looked longer 
at the Not-allowed condition of Experiment 1 because of the higher conceptual saliency 
of the displayed event. The current experiment addressed the question whether infants 
have a spontaneous preference for events showing a social interaction between agents 
compared to events showing an object-directed action. 
Infants were presented with movies showing two animated agents and two unanimated 
objects. In the Object-Directed Action condition (ODA), infants saw one agent 
collecting one object. In the Interaction condition (INT), infants saw one agent move 
towards the other one and return to the agent’s initial position without carrying any 
object. If infants did not have a spontaneous preference for events showing social 
interactions between agents, looking patterns between conditions should not differ 
significantly.   
Participants 
The study was conducted at the Pediatric Unit of the Hospital of Monfalcone, Italy. 
Fifteen healthy full-term 9-month-old infants (9 girls and 6 boys; age M = 273 days; SD 
= 12) participated in this experiment. An additional infant was excluded from the 
sample because of inattention. Infants of the appropriate age were recruited for 
participation through phone calls. Parents gave their informed consent before the infants 
participated. After testing, they received a certificate of participation. 
Stimuli and procedure 
Animations displayed two animated agents (A and B) and two unanimated objects (first 
object and second object). The animated agents were a green and a yellow hexagon of 
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equal size, each provided with eyes. Objects were two identical brown circular shapes. 
All infants were presented with two conditions, two trials per condition: an Object-
Directed Action Condition (ODA) and an Interaction Condition (INT). In total, infants 
saw four trials presented in the order ABAB or BABA.  
Each trial started showing the two agents on the upper part of the scene. Agent A was in 
contact with the first object, facing agent B. The second object was located on the lower 
part of the scene. At the beginning of each test trial, the eyes of the two agents were 
pointed downward (Fig. 8). 
  
 
Fig. 8   
First frame from one of the movies presented in 
Experiment 3. The scene displays the two animated 
agents (a yellow and a green hexagon provided with 
eyes: agent A and B) and the two objects (two brown 
circular shapes: first and second object). Agent A is in 
contact with the first object. 
 
In the ODA condition, first the two agents looked at each other. Then, agent B moved 
toward the second object, picked it up and returned to agent B’s initial position carrying 
the object (Fig. 9, first row). In the INT condition, first agent A and agent B looked at 
each other. Then, agent B moved toward agent A, made contact with the first object and 
returned to agent B’s initial position without carrying the object (Fig. 9, second row). 
Each test movie lasted 7.5 seconds. 
Order of trials (ODA first vs. INT first), color of the agents (yellow vs. green) and side 
of agents (left vs. right) were fully counterbalanced across participants, for a total of 8 
different conditions. Setting and procedure were identical to Experiment 1. 
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Fig.9 Some selected frames from one of the movies presented in Experiment 3. First row: Object-
Directed Action Condition. Agent B collects the second object. Second row: Interaction Condition. 
Agent B moves toward agent A, makes contact with the first object and returns to agent B’s initial 
position without carrying any object.   
 
Coding 
An off-line frame-by-frame analysis of looking behavior was performed. To be included 
in the analysis, infants had to follow at least 75% of each trial type. The dependent 
variable was the time the infant spent looking at the still picture at the end of each trial, 
from the time the agent B returned to its initial position, until the infant looked away for 
at least two consecutive seconds or 60 seconds had elapsed. 
 
Results and discussion 
Preliminary analyses have been run to assess the possible effect of the order of trials 
(ODA first vs. INT first), color of the agent (yellow vs. green) and side of agent (left vs. 
right). The analysis found neither a significant main effect for any of these variables, 
nor significant interactions with infants’ looking time (all ps > .30). Infants did not 
show significant differences in their looking behavior between the Object-Directed 
Action Condition and the Interaction Condition (M = 17.42 s SD = 10.28 s and M = 
57 
 
18.76 s SD = 22.77 s, respectively), t14 = .31, p = .75. Looking times during trials are 
depicted in Fig. 10. Results demonstrated that infants did not show a spontaneous 
preference for the event showing an interaction between agents compared to the event 
showing an object-directed action (the acquisition of an object). 
 
 
Fig. 10 Average looking times (with standard error bars) to the Object-Directed Action and to the 
Interaction conditions. 
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Experiment 4 
As said, the perceptual cues that can elicit a representation of possession are physical 
contact and physical proximity between a subject and an object. Results from 
Experiment 1 demonstrate that 9-month-old infants show longer looking times during 
the Not-allowed condition compared to the Allowed condition. The current experiment 
addressed the question whether 9-month-old infants discriminate between a taking 
action (the acquisition of a possessed object) and an acquiring action (the acquisition of 
a non-possessed object) when possession is expressed through proximity instead of 
contact. Infants were familiarized with an agent (the Possessor) collecting and dropping 
one of two available objects. During tests, infants watched two different conditions: in 
the Allowed condition, a second agent (the Competitor) collected the other available 
object. In the Not-allowed condition, the Competitor collected the object previously 
relinquished by the Possessor. Thus, in the current experiment, the reallocation of 
possession occurs without a direct interaction between agents. If infants consider 
proximity as a cue of possession, they should show a similar looking pattern as in 
Experiment 1. 
Participants 
The study was conducted at the Baby Lab of the University of Padova, Italy. Eleven 
healthy full-term 9-month-old infants (5 girls and 6 boys; age M = 258 days, SD = 22) 
participated in Experiment 4. Two infants were excluded from the sample due to 
experimental error. Infants of the appropriate age were recruited for participation 
through phone calls. Parents gave their informed consent before the infants participated. 
After testing, they received a certificate of participation. 
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Stimuli and procedure 
Animations displayed two animated agents (Possessor and Competitor) and two 
unanimated objects (first and second object) identical to the ones used in Experiment 1. 
All infants were shown a Familiarization phase (four trials) and a Test phase (two 
conditions: Allowed and Not-allowed condition; two trials per condition). 
Movies displayed during the familiarization phase were identical to Experiment 1 
except for the last part of the event. After having acquired the first object, the Possessor 
returned to the Possessor’s initial position. At this point, instead of staying in that 
position, the Possessor dropped the object and withdrew towards the border of the 
screen (Fig 11, first row). Each familiarization trial lasted 14 seconds. 
All test trials started by showing the last frame of the familiarization trials. The scene 
displayed the Possessor in proximity with the first object on the upper part of the scene, 
facing the Competitor, and the second object still available on the lower part of the 
scene. The events shown during the Allowed and the Not-allowed condition were 
identical to Experiment 1. The only exception was the Possessor’s spatial position in 
relation to the first object (Fig 11 second and third rows).  
Each test trial lasted 7.5 seconds. Order of test trials (Allowed first vs. Not-allowed 
first), colors of agents (red vs. blue) and side of entry of agents (left vs. right) were fully 
counterbalanced across participants. Setting and procedure were identical to Experiment 
1. 
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Fig. 11 Some selected frames from one of the movies presented in Experiment 4. First row: 
familiarization phase. The red agent (the Possessor) collects one of two available objects. Immediately 
after, the Possessor drops the object and withdraws towards the border of the screen. Second row: Test 
phase, Allowed condition. The blue agent (the Competitor) collects the other available object. Third row: 
Test phase, Not-allowed condition. The blue agent (the Competitor) takes the object from the Possessor. 
  
Coding 
An off-line frame-by-frame analysis of looking behavior was performed. Blinks were 
considered as look-away if they lasted for more than 0.25 s. To be included in the final 
data analysis, infants had to follow at least 3 familiarization trials and 75% of each test 
trial type. The dependent variable was the time the infant spent looking at the still 
picture at the end of each test trial, from the time the Competitor reached the final 
position, until the infant looked away for at least 2 consecutive seconds or 60 seconds 
had elapsed. 
Results and discussion 
Infants’ looking times at the still picture at the end of each test condition were analyzed 
in a 2 (test conditions type: Allowed vs. Not-allowed) x 2 (order of test trials: Allowed 
first vs. Not-allowed first) x 2 (colors of agents: red or blue) and side of entry of agents 
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(left or right) repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA). This analysis found 
neither a significant main effect of any of these variables, nor significant interactions 
with infants’ looking time (all ps > .12). Infants did not show significant differences in 
their looking times between the Not-allowed condition and the Allowed condition (M = 
16.22 s, SD =13.06 s and M = 14.63 s, SD = 9.32 s respectively), t10 =.63, p = .54. 
Looking times during test trials are depicted in Fig. 12. The results of the current 
experiment demonstrated that nine-months-old infants did not look reliably longer at 
test trials showing a taking event when they saw the Possessor losing contact with the 
object. 
 
 
 
Fig. 12 Average looking times (with standard error bars) to the Allowed and to the Not-allowed 
condition. 
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General discussion 
As predicted, results from Experiment 1 showed that 9-month-olds looked longer at the 
Not-allowed condition compared to the Allowed-condition. These results suggest that 
infants differentiate between an acquiring event and a taking event. Moreover, the 
direction of infants’ preference demonstrates that they consider violation of possession 
to be more salient compared to the acquisition of a non-possessed object. These results 
seem to contradict the recent findings of Tatone and colleagues (2015) regarding giving 
and taking interactions. Nevertheless, some important differences between the studies 
could explain the contradicting results. First, our infants were exposed to a 
familiarization phase explicitly designed to elicit a representation of possession both as 
a status (the object’s motion was controlled by the Possessor) and as a goal (the 
Possessor’s goal was to collect one of the objects and maintain its possession through 
physical contact) as well as elicit an attribution of value to the possessed object. Second, 
during testing, infants could see that both the possessed object and the non-possessed 
object were available and that the distance between the Competitor and each of the two 
objects was identical. This spatial relation made the two options equally feasible to 
achieve. Despite these similarities, infants showed increased interest towards the event 
involving violation of possession. Therefore, we propose that infants’ differential 
looking was due to the infants expecting the agents’ behaviour to be guided by the 
respect of possession principle. 
By contrast, six months old infants did not look reliably longer at test trials showing the 
stealing event compared to test trials showing the acquisition of a non-possessed object. 
The lack of differential responses to the test events in the 6-month-old group could 
potentially be due to either their failure to track the agents and process social 
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relationships or due to methodological reasons. In general, experimental works on 
infants’ ability to encode complex social interactions show negative results before 9 
months of age. For example, Csibra et al. (1999) demonstrated that 9-month-olds, but 
not 6, are able to discriminate between rational and irrational dynamic events (see also 
Gergely et al., 1994, 1995). By the age of 9 months, infants are able to encode reaction 
events between geometrical figures such as chasing events on the basis of dynamic cues 
(Morgan & Rochat, 1998; Schlottmann, Surian, & Ray, 2003). By the end of the first 
year infants start to evaluate third-party social interactions according to the contexts in 
which the observed behaviors are performed (Hamlin et al., 2011). Despite this 
evidence, our results showed that, although non-significant, a trend to look longer at the 
Not-allowed condition already at 6 months of age. Moreover, the inter-individual 
variability we found at 6 months of age was very high compared to the variability at 9 
months of age. An alternative explanation could therefore be related to methodological 
issues, specifically to the number of trials shown during the familiarization phase. As 
previously said, the familiarization phase was conceptualized with the intent to prompt a 
representation of possession as a goal, and to elicit an attribution of value to the 
possessed object. The number of familiarization trials was kept identical for both age 
groups tested. Several habituation/dishabituation studies demonstrated that the number 
of trials required to reach the habituation differs between individuals and decreases with 
increasing age (Houston-Price & Nakai, 2004; Oakes, 2010). If six-month-olds require 
more time of exposure in habituation/dishabituation tasks compared to 9-month-olds, it 
is possible that the four trials they were exposed to in our experiment were not sufficient 
to prompt a conceptual representation of possession. This aspect might have affected the 
6-month-olds’ ability to differentiate between the subsequent events presented during 
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the test phase and explain the comparatively high variability in looking behavior 
between participants. 
The 9-month-olds’ differential attention to the two test conditions allows us to draw two 
types of inferences: 1) the difference between the events has been discriminated and 2) 
the direction of infants’ preference reflects the relative salience of the presented events. 
The salience of the stimuli can be determined by different properties, such as perceptual 
features, level of complexity, conceptual or affective differences between the events, 
and by their relative familiarity or novelty (Kidd, Piantadosi, & Aslin, 2012); Quinn et 
al. 2002; Shaddy & Colombo, 2004). Experiment 2 and 3 served as controls to 
investigate if infants had a priori preferences for certain types of stimuli, and to 
disambiguate low-level perceptual differences from high-level conceptual differences 
between the two conditions presented in Experiment 1. Experiment 2 controlled for the 
possibility that infants responded to perceptual differences between the two scenes, 
specifically to different levels of perceptual complexity. The difference between test 
trials of Experiment 1 and trials of Experiment 2 was the nature of the elements 
involved in the events (2 agents and two objects in Experiment 1 and only one agent 
and three objects in Experiment 2). Thus, Experiment 2 controlled for the perceptual 
complexity of the events by presenting the Possessor from Experiment 1 as an 
unanimated object instead of an animated agent. In Experiment 3, we wanted to 
investigate if infants were sensitive to the differences in high-level conceptual saliency 
of an interaction event compared to an object-directed event. The two tested conditions 
differed in the goal of the acting agent. In the Interaction condition, infants were 
exposed to a simple interaction between two animated agents. This condition was 
explicitly designed in order to disambiguate the combined effects of the interaction and 
the object-directed event displayed in the Not-allowed condition of Experiment 1. In 
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both Experiment 2 and 3 infants showed neither a spontaneous preference for events 
with higher perceptual complexity, nor a spontaneous preference for interactions over 
goal-directed actions. These findings support the hypothesis that infants’ preferential 
looking at the Not-allowed condition in Experiment 1 was due to the higher saliency of 
the violation of possession event compared to the acquisition of a non-possessed object. 
A further possible explanation of the results of Experiment 1 is that infants might have 
responded to the relative novelty of the Not-allowed condition compared to the Allowed 
condition. During the familiarization phase of Experiment 1, infants were familiarized 
with an agent (Possessor) following a specific path in order to reach one of two objects 
located in the lower part of the scene. Subsequently, during the test phase, infants were 
exposed to a similar event (Allowed condition) and a completely different event (Not-
allowed condition). In the Allowed condition, the path of the Competitor towards the 
non-possessed object mirrored the one followed by the Possessor in the previous phase. 
In the Not-allowed condition, instead, the Competitor followed a different path in order 
to reach and pick up the Possessor’s object. It is well known that infants show a 
predisposition to shift their preference from familiar to novel stimuli, after having been 
exposed to the familiar stimulus (Cohen, Gelber, & Lazar, 1971). Other studies 
demonstrated that infants rapidly form expectations for spatial and temporal parameters 
of stimulus sequences and use this information to anticipate subsequent events (Canfield 
& Haith, 1991). Thus, the infants’ preference for the Not-allowed condition could be 
due to a recovery of attention to the new stimulus. Nevertheless, results of Experiment 4 
seem to rule out this possibility. The dynamic events shown in the two test conditions of 
Experiment 4 were identical to those presented in Experiment 1. The only difference 
between them was the relative spatial position of the Possessor to the other elements of 
the scene. Since infants exposed to Experiment 1 and 4 did not show a similar looking 
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behavior, we conclude that the infants’ preference for the Not-allowed condition in 
Experiment 1 was not driven by the relative novelty of the Not-allowed condition 
compared to the Allowed one. 
Results of Experiment 4 demonstrated that nine months old infants did not look reliably 
longer at test trials showing a stealing event when possession was expressed through 
proximity instead of contact. In Experiment 4, infants were familiarized with an agent 
(the Possessor) collecting and dropping one of two available objects. The dynamic 
events shown during the Allowed and the Not-allowed condition were identical to 
Experiment 1. The only exception was the Possessor’s spatial position with respect to 
the object previously collected. Several alternative interpretations of these results are 
possible. One possible interpretation is that infants did not have enough elements to 
build a representation of possession as in Experiment 1. The familiarization phase of 
Experiment 4, indeed, presents some elements of ambiguity. First, infants saw the 
Possessor collecting the object, then they saw the Possessor losing contact with its 
possession. It is possible that the infants interpreted this dropping action as an abandon 
of the object, making the object a non-possessed object again. Another possibility is that 
the first part of the movie (collecting the object) was not sufficient in order to elicit a 
representation of possession as a goal. Infants might have interpreted the Possessor’s 
actions as moving objects from one place to another, without attributing possession as 
the goal of the action. The other possible alternative interpretation is that infants did not 
differentiate between the taking event and the acquiring event because the reallocation 
of possession occurred as a two-step transfer of possession without a direct interaction 
between agents. Evidence of infants’ ability to encode a two-step transfer of possession 
between agents is contrasting. In Shoppner et al. (2006), 10 months old infants did not 
interpret a transfer of possession without direct interaction as a social event occurring 
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between two agents. By contrast, according to Hamlin & Wynn, 2011, infants are able 
to evaluate a taking event negatively, even when it does not occur through a direct 
interaction between subjects (no restitution event). Results of Experiment 4 suggest that 
proximity per se is not a sufficiently strong cue in order to maintain the notion of a 
possessive relationship between agent and object, and infants encode the acquisition of 
the previously possessed object in the same way as they encode the acquisition of the 
non-possessed object. It is possible that in order to encode the Not-allowed event of 
Experiment 4 as a violation of possession, infants need additional cues such as an 
attempted resistance or an emotional reaction of the possessor towards the Competitor’s 
actions. 
Summarizing, the results of our investigation provide evidence of an early form of 
ownership understanding, in the specific sense of sensitivity to certain cues of 
possession. This ability has been tested in events involving animated geometrical 
figures, the results suggesting that infants apply this ability to all entities recognized as 
agents, not only to humans. Our findings are in line with other studies demonstrating 
infants’ ability to track transfers of possession between agents (Geraci & Surian, 2011; 
Mascaro & Csibra, 2012; Tatone et al., 2015). Nevertheless, this is the first study to 
specifically investigate from a third-person perspective the evaluation of different cues 
of possession and sensitivity to violation of possession in infants. If provided with 
enough information, infants are able to build a representation of possession as a goal 
and differentiate between violation of possession and the acquisition of a non-possessed 
object. We interpreted the direction of their preference as evidence of an early 
appreciation of first possession rule and respect of possession principle. These 
behavioural rules, which are grounded in minimal perceptual information, specify what 
is permissible, convenient and less risky in social interactions involving resources. Our 
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findings provide support to the theory that an early sense of ownership is a basic 
cognitive mechanism rooted in our evolutionary history. 
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STUDY 2 
 
Introduction 
Results from Study 1 suggest that, as third-party observers, nine months old infants 
seem to recognize others’ possession and, possibly, the social rules concerning 
ownership by showing interest when possession is violated. In the second part of my 
research, I focused on analyzing infants’ behavior related to cues of possession from a 
first-person perspective. 
The majority of conflicts among children involve possession and use of objects (Dunn, 
1988; Hay & Ross, 1982; Ramsey, 1987; Shantz, 1987). Several developmental studies 
on ownership understanding from the child’s first-person perspective are indeed based 
on behavioral observations of children during peers’ interactions involving objects (Hay 
et al., 2011; Hay & Ross, 1982; Ross et al., 2011). Even if self-interest tends to prevail 
during peer interactions, and children try to maximize their own gain, they still seem to 
apply an intuitive knowledge of basic ownership concepts to solve their conflicts 
(Bakeman & Brownlee, 1982; Ross et al., 2011; Winegar & Renninger, 1989). At two 
years of age, for example, toddlers are already able to resolve conflicts about objects 
ownership by applying the first possessor rule. Moreover, the first child to gain 
possession of an object is usually also the one to win the dispute over it (Ross, 1996). In 
the mid-1980s, Weigel (1984) adapted the theoretical evolutionary model on animal 
conflict developed by Maynard Smith and Parker (Maynard Smith & Parker, 1976; 
Maynard Smith, 1974) for an experimental study on preschool children social conflicts. 
Specifically, he tested some predictions of the model on the strategies adopted by 
children during social conflicts involving possession of objects. Results from this study 
showed that the probability for a child to continue or terminate a conflict depended on 
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the possession of the object (children resisted more if they were in possession of the 
object), on the relative distance of children from the object, and on the level of 
aggressiveness of the opponent. Similar results have been obtained by DeScioli & 
Wilson (2011) in an experiment about human territorial disputes and fighting decisions 
in a virtual environment. Indeed, being the first in possession of an object (or seeing 
someone else having the first contact with an object) seems to elicit a set of decisions 
and behaviors aimed at maximizing the probability of obtaining a benefit and 
minimizing the probability of incurring a cost (Weigel, 1984). This evidence seems to 
support the hypothesis that, during development, the abstract concept of ownership 
arises from a hardwired set of core competences and that children progressively 
integrate their knowledge of ownership rights into a set of strategies that they 
spontaneously apply during object-interactions with others. 
As previously mentioned, our interaction with the surrounding physical and social 
environment can be described in terms of affordances. Despite the fact that the notion of 
affordance has been introduced by Gibson more than 30 years ago (Gibson, 1979), 
only within the last few years researcher have started to thoroughly investigate the 
interaction between perception, action, and cognition, and how the activation of specific 
affordances can be modulated by the external environment or by the context. A recent 
approach suggests that objects’ affordances are flexible and context depended (Borghi, 
Flumini, Natraj, & Wheaton, 2012; Borghi & Riggio, 2015). For example, experimental 
works on adults demonstrated that the same object can evoke multiple and sometimes 
conflicting affordances, depending both on its structure and function, and on the 
physical context in which it is embedded (for example, when an object is presented 
together with another object either functionally or spatially related to the first) (Jax & 
Buxbaum, 2010; Kalénine, Shapiro, & Flumini, 2014). The social context plays an 
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important role as well. Several studies have demonstrated that the activation of 
affordances can be modulated by the presence of another individual, by the strength of 
our relationship with the other individual, and by the behavioral dispositions of others 
(Becchio et al. 2008; Costantini et al., 2011; Ferri et al., 2011, Scorolli et al. 2014a; 
Gianelli, Scorolli & Borghi, 2013).  
With regard to object ownership, recent studies on adults have demonstrated that 
physical interaction with objects is affected once individuals know that those objects 
belong to someone else (Constable et al., 2011, 2014). In these works, participants were 
asked to perform simple movements with mugs that differed in terms of ownership (i.e., 
self-owned, other-owned, not owned). Results showed that objects’ affordances are 
inhibited when participants had to manipulate other people’s property compared to the 
manipulation of self-owned objects or not owned objects. 
Despite this growing body of research, to my knowledge this methodological approach 
has not yet been adopted in infants and young children studies in order to investigate the 
developmental trajectory of ownership cognition, how perception of affordances 
changes during the first year of life, and how the social context affects the kinematics of 
infants’ interaction with objects. During development, it has been suggested that the 
sensory-motor experience associated with object possession plays an important role in 
self-ownership cognition and that an early understanding of others-ownership is 
primarily based on the visual association between individuals and objects (Friedman, 
2008; Friedman & Neary, 2008; Rochat, 2010). However, there are no recent studies 
that have investigated how cues of others’ possession affect the infants’ interaction with 
objects (but see Hay et al., 1983 for an exception). 
The aim of the current study was to explore early ownership cognition by analyzing 
infants’ behavior from a first-person perspective using an interactive paradigm where 
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the infant was directly involved in a subject-object interaction. The study was 
exploratory in nature and was primarily designed to assess how and when the abilities to 
respect others’ possession emerge during development and if the acquisition process 
(i.e., the act of taking possession of an object) could be affected by others’ possession. 
Six and 9 months old infants have been tested in a choice task involving two identical 
objects, one of which was possessed by the experimenter (depending on the condition, 
one of the two objects was either in physical contact or in proximity to the 
experimenter’s hand). By making the objects themselves equally salient, only the 
presence of the experimenter’s hand should influence infants’ choices. Infants’ 
preference (manual choice) for one of the objects was coded. We hypothesized that if 
infants recognized contact and proximity as cues of others’ possession and those cues 
acted as a social constraint, the acquisition process would be affected by respect of 
possession and infants would prefer to choose the non-possessed object. Considering 
the results of Study 1, we could hypothesize that because 6-month-olds did not 
recognize contact and proximity as cues of possession, they would not show a 
preference for either object. Nine-month-olds, on the other hand, should recognize the 
cues of possession and accordingly choose the non-possessed object.  An alternative 
hypothesis, however, might be that at this age cues of others-possession could drive the 
preference of the infants toward the possessed object. In the first stage of life, until the 
child becomes independent, interactions with objects are indeed strongly mediated by 
the presence of a caregiver. Objects presented and offered to the infants are constantly 
associated with the presence of another individual, specifically with a giving hand. 
Others’ possession represents thus the condicio sine qua non that facilitates the onset of 
infants’ possession and allows infants-objects interactions. 
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Participants 
The study was conducted at the Uppsala Child and Baby Lab of the Uppsala University, 
Sweden. The sample consisted of 22 6-month-old infants (11 girls and 11 boys; age 
M = 182 days, SD = 6.5) and 22 9-month-old infants (8 girls and 14 boys; age M = 278 
days, SD = 7). An additional 24 infants were excluded from the final sample for failing 
to complete testing due to fussiness (four 6-month-olds and six 9-month-olds), for 
having shown lateral bias in reaching (three 6-month-olds and eight 9-month-olds) (see 
Coding part for explanation), or due to experimental error (two 6-month-olds and one 9-
month-olds). Participants were recruited from the database of parents who expressed 
interest in participating in studies with their child. Infants were tested only after parents 
gave their informed consent. For participation, parents received a gift voucher of 100 
Swedish Crowns (12 Euro). 
Apparatus 
The apparatus consisted in a theatre with a curtain that the experimenter could lift up 
and lower through a pulley system (Fig 1, left). The theatre’s stage was surrounded by 
black screens, which created a neutral environment that was free of distractions. During 
the experiment, the stage was lit while the rest of the room was darkened. Infants sat on 
their parent's lap, facing the opening of the theatre, while the experimenter sat on the 
back side of the theatre (Fig 1, right). The distance from the table to the infant's chest 
was approximately15 cm. 
Infants were presented with sixteen pairs of objects. Each pair was composed by two 
identical objects. Objects were items available for purchase in large markets and they 
differed in shapes, colours and dimensions (Fig. 2). They have been chosen to be 
attractive and easily graspable. In order to allow the objects’ movement during the 
second phase of each trial (see procedure), they were placed on a plastic board of 40 cm 
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x 53 cm. A camera to the left of the infant was focused to include the infant’s upper 
body and part of the stage. 
 
 
 
EXPERIMENTER 
 
PARTICIPANT 
Fig 1 Left: theatre, frontal view (infant perspective). Two identical objects are placed on the board.  
Right: schematic representation of the stage (above view). 
 
  
 
Fig 2 Object presented in Study 2 
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Procedure  
At the beginning of the experiment, infants were familiarized with the apparatus and the 
procedure: the curtain was lifted up and lowered a few times, and each time the curtain 
was raised the experimenter smiled and said “Hello” to the infant. Infants were not 
presented with objects during familiarization. 
Experiment consisted in 16 trials, and each trial was composed by two phases. The first 
phase allowed the infants to look at the objects, without the opportunity to touch them; 
during the second phase, infants could reach for the objects.  
At the beginning of each trial the curtain was closed and the experimenter placed a pair 
of identical objects on the board. Objects were 20 cm distant to each other and 15 cm 
distant from the stage edge (infant side). A trial started with a bell ring during which the 
curtain was partially lifted up (20 cm from the tabletop) revealing the two objects, but 
not the experimenter. Even if the two objects were out of reach for the infant, in case of 
attempted reaching during this phase parents were instructed to gently hold back their 
babies. After eight seconds the curtain was lowered and the first phase ended. 
In the second phase, each infant was presented with two different conditions that 
expressed two different cues of possession. Before the curtain was lifted up, the 
experimenter placed one of her hands in contact or in proximity with one of the two 
objects (i.e., the right hand was placed on the right side of the right object, or vice 
versa). In the Contact condition, the hand was positioned so that fingers and part of the 
palm touched the object (see Fig 3 A); in the Proximity condition, the palm lied flat on 
the board without touching the object (see Fig 3 B). 
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A B 
Fig. 3 A: Contact condition. The experimenter’s hand touches the object  
B: Proximity condition. The experimenter’s hand lies flat on the board without touching the object. 
 
The second phase of each trial started with a bell ring, during which the curtain was 
totally lifted up, revealing both the objects and the experimenter. After smiling for a few 
seconds, the experimenter slid the board toward the infant until the board and the stage 
edges were coincident, and the objects were in reach for the infant. While sliding, the 
experimenter’s gaze was directed toward the infant and never toward the objects. When 
the board movement ended, the experimenter looked downwards lowering her head and 
waited in this position until the infant made a choice; the trial ended when the infant 
touched or grasped one of the objects, or after 20 seconds without any contact. If one 
object was grasped, the infant was allowed to hold it for a few seconds; then the parent, 
previously instructed on the procedure, removed the object from the infant’s hands and 
put it inside a box on the floor. After that, the curtain was lowered and a new pair of 
objects was set in place. This procedure was repeated for sixteen times. 
Each infant faced 8 trials per condition (contact and proximity). The two conditions 
were presented in a ABBA or BAAB order counterbalanced between participants. The 
position of the experimenter hand (left or right) was balanced across trials and 
conditions; objects were presented in a random order across participants. 
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Coding 
Coding was done off-line from video recordings. We considered as choice the first 
contact the infant made with one of the two objects. A choice was classified as same 
when the infant touched or grasped the object that was in contact or proximity with the 
experimenter’s hand (the possessed object) or as different when the infant touched or 
grasped the other object (the non-possessed object). When the infant didn't touch any 
objects or touched both of the objects at the same time (within a range of 40 ms) we 
classified the trial as no-choice (see Fig. 4). Due to the low number of no-choice 
occurrences (15 cases in the 9-month-old group and 13 cases in the 6-month-old group), 
these trials have been excluded from the analysis. Infants that showed a lateral bias in 
reaching were excluded from the sample. To be included, an infant had to use the non-
preferred hand at least in two of the total number of performed choices. 
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 A  B 
 C  D 
 E  F 
Fig. 4 Examples of coded choices. A: Proximity condition, the infant chooses the same object. B: 
Proximity condition, the infant chooses the different object. C: Contact condition, the infant 
chooses the same object. D: Contact condition, the infant chooses the different object. E, F: Two 
cases of no-choice. 
  
Results 
Analyses were performed with the open-source software R (R Core Team, 2015). Data 
were analyzed through mixed-effects multiple regression model (e.g., Jaeger, 2008) 
using the lme4 package for R (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2014). We used the 
logistic link-function, which is appropriate for a dependent variable with binary 
distribution (i.e., binary choice). 
The advantage of mixed-effects models is that analysis are performed on the number of 
observations rather than on number of participants (in our case 671 observations vs. 44 
participants) eliminating the need to average across trials. Moreover, they do not assume 
independence amongst observations and they allow considering all factors that 
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potentially contribute to the understanding of the structure of the data (Baayen, 
Davidson, & Bates, 2008). These factors comprise the variables controlled by the 
experimenter and random-effects factors (i.e., individual variability). The inclusion of 
random effect means that the variability associated to these variables is taken into 
account into the model. The statistical procedure used in GLMM allows to choose the 
model that fits the data best. We started from an initial model including all variables 
(fixed and random effects) and their interactions. Then we stepwise excluded variables 
one by one and performed comparisons between models through likelihood ratio tests. 
A variable was removed from the model if it did not contribute to significantly improve 
the goodness of fit of the model.  
We categorized the choice performed by infants as 0 when the infant chose the same 
object (the possessed object) and as 1 when the infant chose the different object (the 
non-possessed object). In the model, the outcome (i.e., the dependent variable) was the 
probability to choose the different object. Age (6 months vs. 9 months), condition 
(contact vs. proximity) and order of presentation of conditions across trials (ABBA vs. 
BAAB) were treated as fixed effects. Participant and objects were treated as random 
effects. The model that fits the data best included the main effect of age and main effect 
of condition. Results of the final model are reported in Fig. 5 with odds ratios (ORs) as 
a measure of effect size. 
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B (SE) z p OR 
Age: 9 vs 6 months 0.53 (0.19) 2.83 0.004 1.7 
Condition: proximity vs contact -0.30 (0.16) 0.16 0.06 0.74 
 
Fig. 5 Plots and results of logistic mixed-effects model. Fixed effects of age and condition on probability 
to choose the different (non-possessed) object. B, unstandardized regression coefficient; SE, standard 
error; z, effect size; OR, odds ratio. 
 
 
Results from the model are to be interpreted as follow: the probability to choose the 
different (non-possessed) object at 9 months of age is significantly higher than the 
probability to choose the non-possessed object at 6 months of age. Instead, the effect of 
condition is only marginally significant: the probability to choose the non-possessed 
object seems not to be affected by condition. 
In addition, comparisons for each age group between the proportion of different choices 
and chance level (0.5) have been performed. The mean proportions of different choices 
and their 95% confidence intervals by age and condition are presented in Fig. 6. In 
addition, chance level is reported (0.5). When tested against chance level, results show 
that 9 months old chose significantly more the different object than chance level in the 
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contact condition, but not in the proximity condition (Mcontact = 0.6, SEcontact = 0.04, t(21) 
= 2.42, p = 0.02; Mproximity = 0.50 SEproximity = 0.04, t (21) = -0.01, p = 0.99). By contrast, 
6 months old chose significantly more the same object (the possessed object) in the 
proximity condition, but not in the contact condition (Mcontact = 0.43, SEcontact = 0.04, 
t(21) = -1.41, p = 0.17; Mproximity = 0.4, SEproximity = 0.03, t (21) = -2.57, p = 0.01). 
 
 
Fig. 6 Mean proportions and 95% confidence intervals of different choices in 6-month-olds, and 
9-month-olds by condition. Asterisks indicate means that differ significantly from chance at p < .05 
  
* 
* 
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Discussion 
The aim of the study was to explore the age of emergence of the ability to respect 
others’ possession and analyze the role of different cues of possession. Infants were 
presented with two identical objects, one of which was indicated to be possessed by the 
experimenter. Possession was expressed by either physical proximity or contact of the 
experimenter’s hand with one of the two objects. Importantly, before making a choice, 
infants had the possibility to see that the two objects were identical. 
Results from the present study revealed that 1) infants in their first year of life are 
sensitive to the physical relation between object and experimenter’s hand, 2) infants’ 
choice behaviour changes considerably between 6 and 9 months of age, and 3) infants’ 
choice is modulated by the type of spatial relation between object and experimenter’s 
hand. Specifically, our results demonstrated that at 9 months of age infants show the 
tendency to choose the non-possessed object. This tendency was greater when the 
experimenter’s hand was in contact with the object than when it was only in proximity. 
By contrast, 6-month-olds show an opposite trend, choosing more the possessed object. 
This tendency was greater when the experimenter’s hand was in proximity with the 
object than when it was in contact. These contrasting results can be interpreted 
hypothesizing that the acquisition process was affected by the co-occurrence of different 
mechanisms that drove the infant’s preference toward one of the objects: on the one 
side, the emerging ability to respect others’ possession, on the other, the tendency of 
infants to follow referential cues in order to direct their own choices.  
Sensitivity to communicative cues is a hallmark in human cognition and several studies 
demonstrated how human’s gaze, facial expressions, infant-directed speech, pointing 
gesture and others’ choices affect infants’ preference towards objects present in the 
environment (Mumme & Fernald, 2003; Okumura, Kanakogi, Kanda, Ishiguro, & 
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Itakura, 2013; Repacholi, 1998). This ability plays a primary role in social learning, 
enabling infants to acquire information from the environment in a rapid and efficient 
way (Csibra & Gergely, 2006; Gergely Csibra, 2010; Tomasello, 1999). 
Nevertheless, the ability to follow social cues is a developing skill as well. According to 
a huge body of evidence, during the first half year of life, infants have been shown to 
engage mostly in dyadic interactions both with objects and with other individual. For 
example, infants engage in turn-taking mutual gaze, face-to-face exchange of smiles, 
and repetitions of actions towards objects (Striano & Rochat, 1999; Tomasello, 1999). 
But around 9 months of age, an important transition in social cognitive development 
occurs, as infants start to show triadic social competence, that is the ability to engage in 
referential sharing with others about things in the environment (M Tomasello, 1995; 
Trevarthen, 1998). At this age, infants start monitoring a social partner in contexts of 
objects exploration. They use others’ display of emotions as information to 
disambiguate novel situations in the environment. Importantly, they begin to understand 
and express communicative gestures like pointing, offering, and presenting objects. In 
this triangulation, objects become the medium of a social exchange and instruments to 
control the social environment (Rochat, 2014; Zahavi & Rochat, 2015). The emerging 
ability of triadic competences suggests moreover that infants begin to perceive a context 
as composed of social and physical elements connected to each other and to associate a 
global meaning to this context, instead of merely focus on salient portions of it. Most 
importantly, they begin to understand self and others as intentional actors, to use 
multiple behavioral means to achieve the same goal, and to shape their behavior 
according to the context (Tomasello, 1999; Tomasello & Rakoczy, 2003). 
Our results showed that both 6 and 9 month olds are sensitive to the physical relation 
between object and experimenter’s hand, but their choice behaviour shows an opposite 
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trend. According to the aforementioned developmental trajectory of infants’ socio-
cognitive abilities, we propose the following interpretation. 
Six-month-old infants chose more the possessed object because they focused their 
attention on the item that was close to the hand, either because the human hand itself 
has a high saliency or because the position of the hand was interpreted as an indicator 
for the object that should be chosen. Moreover, since before 6-months of age infants’ 
ability to grasp objects and actively explore the environment is strongly limited and 
their interaction with objects depends on the presence of another individual, we 
hypothesize that at this age cues of others’ possession increase the affordance of an 
object instead of act as a social constrain. 
By contrast, nine-month-olds chose more the non-possessed object most likely due to 
their emerging ability to understand the global complexity of a context and associate a 
meaning to it. They start to differentiate between the different meanings that underlie 
the relationship between a subject and an object, and they begin to shape their behavior 
according to these different meanings. As infants start to differentiate others’ gestures 
and intentional actions, possessed objects start to have different affordances depending 
on the context in which they are embedded. We propose that the strength of the cues of 
possession (contact vs. proximity) affected the infants’ choice leading to differential 
outcomes and hypothesize that the emerging abilities to respect others’ possession and 
globally evaluate the context do not completely replace the pre-existing preference for 
the referential cued object. When the cue was stronger (contact condition), 9 months old 
preferred the non-possessed object. When the cue was weaker (proximity condition), 
they performed on chance level. 
Being able to interact with other individuals and objects in the environment is an 
essential component of human sociality and in this context the notions of ownership and 
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possession cover a fundamental role. In everyday life, respecting others’ property is an 
automatic behavior that we perform without a conscious thought due to the rapid 
detection of physical cues of possession. Our exploratory study demonstrated that 
infants show a different sensitivity to diverse cues of possession and that an important 
shift in infants’ behavior occurs between 6 and 9 months of age. Since the choice that 
we measured in our experiment can be viewed as the result of several mechanisms 
concurring and conflicting in order to produce an outcome, these contrasting results 
could be interpreted in the light of a dual process interaction: on the one side, the 
emerging ability to respect others’ possession, on the other, the infants’ tendency to 
prefer the socially signaled object. Moreover, it is likely that inter-individual variability 
in socio-cognitive skills and motor abilities inside the two groups of age had an 
important role in modulating infants’ preference and subsequent choice. Our study 
represents a first empirical step towards the exploration of the developmental trajectory 
of ownership understanding during the first year of life. Nevertheless, it is far from 
being able to exhaustively answer all aspects of how infants deal with others’ 
possession.  Several questions remain open to investigation, for example concerning the 
role of multiple variables on infant-object interaction. A first improvement would be to 
consider the effect of possessor’s identity (familiar vs. unfamiliar adult) on infant’s 
preference and behavior. A further possible limitation of our paradigm could be the 
relative ambiguity of the task. In order not to drive infants’ attention toward one of the 
two objects or towards her own face, the experimenter’s gaze was directed downward. 
The absence of joint engagement might have contributed to infants’ performance, 
especially at 9 months of age when infants have been shown to take into great account 
the affective behavior of unfamiliar individuals (Striano & Bertin, 2005). Moreover, the 
way the experimenter touched the object in the contact condition could be opaque for 
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infants because it did not represent the classical forms of giving and taking infants are 
familiar with, leaving them unsure about what the experimenter was doing and what 
they are expected to do. This ambiguity did not affect infants’ willingness to grasp the 
objects though, as is evident from the very low occurrence of no-choices. Using a 
similar paradigm, another possibility would be to analyze which the other physical, 
spatial and attentional cues are that mediate the recognition and respect of others’ 
possession during infancy. Further research should also take into account the potential 
role of objects’ physical features (e.g., dimension, shape, equality/inequality of the two 
objects) as well as their abstract properties (e.g., familiarity, attractiveness, affective 
value). Finally, from a methodological point of view, a fine-grained analysis of infants’ 
motor behavior during the task could add important and reliable information to the 
understanding of the phenomenon. If our hypothesis about the co-occurrence of 
different processes is correct, a kinematic analysis of the action performed towards the 
objects could shed light on the potential conflicting mechanisms that guide infants’ 
preference and underlie the acquisition process of the possessed/non-possessed object. 
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